


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


JPRS Report

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Article Views Prospects for World Disarmament

*HK2008045391 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 32, 12 Aug 91*

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "Situation and Prospects for World Disarmament"]

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union announced that they had already eliminated their remaining differences at the START talks. At their Moscow meeting, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty to reduce strategic weapons. They called this "agreement, reached after nearly 30 years of arduous efforts" a "milestone in the history of arms control" and a "stunning move influencing the strategic balance." During this time, however, arms control and reduction experts from some countries are paying more attention to the prospects for world arms control and reduction in the wake of the signing of the START treaty. They maintain that the treaty is one to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons, not to limit them. It can of course, reduce by a certain degree threats to world peace and security, and will play a certain role in promoting the process of global arms control and reduction. Nonetheless, this treaty alone is far from enough. Serious contradictions, crises, conflicts, and even wars will continue in today's turbulent world. As one of the important mechanisms for handling and resolving these problems, arms control and reduction is very important. There are still numerous problems to be solved in the area of strategic arms reduction and in other areas, and therefore one should not be too optimistic about the prospects for disarmament.

Major problems in arms control and reduction at the present time and for some time to come are:

The question of further reducing strategic arms. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a START agreement, three questions still need to be solved: First, the current START treaty provides that both the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their nuclear stockpiles by 25 to 30 percent so that U.S. nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs will decrease from 12,000 to approximately 9,000, and Soviet nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs will decrease from 11,000 to approximately 7,000. Despite this, the United States and Soviet Union will continue to retain frightening quantities of strategic nuclear weapons, and this will continue to be a great threat to world peace and security. Second, the treaty does not specify strict limitations on the quality of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. While reducing their quantities, both sides can upgrade these nuclear weapons by improving their targeting precision, mobility, and viability. Third, many experts in arms control and reduction raise the question of "further reductions," calling on the United States and Soviet Union to use the opportunity afforded by the signing of the treaty to begin a second phase of START talks. It seems, however, that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union considers arms control and reduction a

central question of their bilateral relations. They have not shown an urgent intention to make further reductions. A U.S. Administration official asserted: "Further reductions do not necessarily reduce the danger of war." While a Soviet official said: "It cannot be ruled out that this treaty is the first and the last one on reducing strategic arms."

The question of eliminating Europe's short-range nuclear weapons. This question was raised as early as 1987 when the treaty on medium-range missiles was signed. Nonetheless, the United States and Soviet Union never attached importance to it, with the result that it was not included as a special item at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons reduction talks. Recently, some countries have once again raised the question of eliminating Europe's short-range nuclear weapons, urging the United States and Soviet Union to solve the issues as soon as possible. However, it seems that both sides are not very enthusiastic about it. Some people maintain that since the United States and Soviet Union are planning to withdraw some short-range nuclear weapons as they withdraw their conventional forces from Europe, they are not willing to make a special effort for it. Many are worried that in the absence of limitations from a treaty or agreement, it is hardly imaginable that the United States and the Soviet Union will remove all their short-range nuclear weapons from Europe as soon as possible. And in view of the serious internal strife or even armed disputes in some East European countries, it is difficult to guarantee against losing control of these nuclear weapons which could in turn bring new disasters to Europe.

The question of European conventional arms reduction. After the "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe" was signed last 19 November in Paris by the 22 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union included three army divisions and approximately 1,000 tanks in its navy, and has since moved part of its weaponry which should be reduced east of the Urals, the United States and other Western countries doubled their misgivings about whether the Soviet Union would carry out the treaty and continually criticized the Soviet Union for breaking the first-phase agreement on European conventional arms reduction. This resulted in a stalemate at the second-phase talks on European conventional arms which began on 14 February this year. Later, after over two months of discussion, the United States and Soviet Union finally reached, on 1 June, an agreement in principle on implementing the treaty on reducing European conventional arms. This was followed by the unanimity reached on 14 June by representatives to the CFE talks, which enabled the process of European conventional arms reduction to develop once again. Since the United States and the Soviet Union are the two major parties to the CFE, every move they make draws special attention from European states. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have drawn up plans for troop withdrawals from Europe, people are now more concerned about how this can be carried out and when it will be finished. Moreover, as far as the present situation

is concerned, U.S. and Soviet plans for troop withdrawals from Europe are far from fulfilling the expectations of people around the world that their withdrawal will be carried out as soon as possible, will be complete, and can be verified.

The question of banning chemical weapons. Last June, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons, and on promoting multilateral measures for banning chemical weapons. In this agreement, the United States stated its decision to retain 2 percent of its chemical weapons. During the Gulf war earlier this year, the United States put forward the idea that it had the right to use chemical weapons to retaliate against an enemy that used these types of weapons first. The United States also called on all countries in possession of, and capable of producing chemical weapons, to retain two percent of their weapons prior to signing a pact on banning these weapons. This position or idea was criticized at home and abroad. Many nonaligned countries criticized the United States for changing its fundamental position, from a total ban and destruction of chemical weapons. Under pressure at home and abroad, the United States announced in May that beginning from the effective date of the pact banning the use of chemical weapons, the United States will not use chemical weapons against another country for any reason and will unconditionally destroy all of its chemical weapons within 10 years of the pact's effective date. This change in the U.S. position is regarded as a step toward the goal of totally banning and thoroughly destroying chemical weapons. What is so worrying is that besides the United States, the Soviet Union also possesses approximately 50,000 to 70,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. Even if the two countries cut 5,000 tonnes each, in keeping with the specifications of the pact, their chemical weapons are still startlingly inhumane and destructive. Moreover, according to U.S. estimates, approximately 20 countries around the world possess or are capable of producing chemical weapons. This is worrying to people around the world. It is very difficult for a pact on totally banning and destroying chemical weapons to be signed. Resistance to this will be greater in countries where "chemical weapons" are regarded as "poor countries' nuclear weapons."

The question of regional arms control. Questions regarding regional arms control such as the preventing the proliferation of nuclear and biochemical weapons, and the limitation of the arms trade have already been put on the agenda. From 8 to 9 July, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council called a meeting in Paris to discuss the question of arms control in the Middle East. The communique published after the meeting announced that the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China supported the establishment of a region in the Middle East where there are no weapons of mass destruction. They suggested that measures be taken to "freeze and ultimately ban surface-to-surface missiles in the region, ban imports and production of material that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, limit arms sales to that region, and urge all

states in the region to sign a new pact on chemical warfare in 1992." They appealed for the "adoption of just, reasonable, balanced, antiproliferation and arms control measures around the world and within regional scope." The meeting and its communique were considered "a new form of cooperation" and "a real breakthrough." The meeting has created a good beginning for regional arms control in the future. Nonetheless, numerous problems still remain unsolved, including: As the United States and the Soviet Union are the largest arms exporters to the Middle East, they should shoulder a special responsibility in limiting the sale of their own weapons. Now they have only made an appeal regarding limiting arms development among Middle East states, but have not fully considered the region's security, balances, and stability. The principle of arms control for the Middle East should also be applicable to other regions, such as Central America and the Asian-Pacific region. These regions should carry out arms control according to their specific situations.

In light of the world's situation of arms control and reduction, we can make the following estimates: First, the U.S.-Soviet START treaty will develop from "limitation" to "reduction," as have the INF treaty and the treaty on conventional forces in Europe. Future U.S.-Soviet START talks will also follow this track. However, since the "theme" that once affected the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is beginning to change, it will be difficult for both sides to make a relatively big breakthrough on the question of making further reductions in a year or two. Second, world arms control and reduction has spread from U.S.-Soviet disarmament and European conventional weapons reduction to arms control in the Middle East. This trend will probably have an impact on Central America and the Asian-Pacific region. Under this trend, the world's arms control and reduction will further widen in scope and content, the question will become more complicated, and difficulties in solving it will increase. Third, such questions as preventing proliferation of nuclear and biochemical weapons, preventing missile technology from spreading elsewhere, and limiting arms sales, will probably become more and more important topics for discussion for some time in the future in the area of global arms control and reduction. More and more countries will probably get involved in it, and the trend for arms reduction to become multilateral, regional, and specific, will be more and more obvious in the future. Fourth, with the limitations of the new arms control and reduction treaty, the armaments of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the major military powers of the world will develop on the quality-replacing-quantity track. More and more high and new technologies will be applied to military development. In the meantime, great changes will occur in the military structures, national defense systems, strategic theories, and tactical principles of all countries. This will, in turn, bring a new mission for world arms control and reduction.

CP Official Voices Support for Korean NFZ

OW2008050091 Beijing XINHUA in English
0441 GMT 20 Aug 91

[Excerpts] Pyongyang, August 19 (XINHUA)—Zhu Liang, head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) Central Committee, held talks here today with Kim Yong-sun, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK). [passage omitted]

Zhu expressed his delight at the achievements and development in Korea's socialist construction, the party build-up, the process of peaceful reunification of Korea and its relations with foreign countries. He expressed support of the Chinese Government to the idea of the Korean Government on the creation of a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] in the Korean peninsula. [passage omitted]

Jiang Zhengcai, charge d'affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Korea and Kim Yang-kon, vice-director of the International Affairs Department of the Central Committee of WPK, were also present at the talks and the banquet.

'Dual Standards' of U.S. Arms Control Policy

HK2808142391 Guangzhou YANGCHENG WANBAO
in Chinese 22 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by Ban Wei (3803 3837): "Dual Standards of U.S. Arms Control Policy"]

[Text] An annual report published in early August by the U.S. Congressional Research Service discloses that as arms exports by some countries have decreased, in 1990 the United States' arms exports increased by more than 100 percent over the previous year. The report says the United States has become the chief exporter of arms, that sales have exceeded those of the Soviet Union for the first time since 1983, and that the Third World, especially the Middle East where the Gulf war ended not long ago, is still the major market for U.S. weapons.

What is strange is that since the Gulf war, the United States has appealed many times for reducing arms exports to the Middle East, which "has already been excessively militarized." This June, the United States called on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to hold a meeting to discuss the question of "collective self-control" over arms sales to the Middle East. In July, the United States proposed instituting the system of "registering" with the United Nations for all arms sales around the world.

World public opinion has noted that the United States seems to be pursuing a dual-standard policy aimed at putting arms control on others rather than itself, and which states the principle while allowing business to be done as usual.

In fact, as soon as the Gulf war was over, the United States immediately forwarded plans to scramble for the armaments market of the Middle East.

In early March, the Bush administration urged Congress to approve the export to Egypt of 46 F-16 combat aircraft and 80 air-to-ground missiles, worth \$1.6 billion. It also planned to sell \$18 billion of weapons to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey. Moreover, in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. munitions industry, the Bush administration also urged Congress to authorize import and export banks to offer loans totaling more than \$1 billion to insure the import of U.S. weapons by foreign countries. Speaking on arms control, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney maintained: That will be a "long and complicated process," and "we must not be so simple as to fall into this sort of trap." "Although arms control is being discussed, it is unwise for us not to supply arms to the Middle East."

A research report entitled "Global Arms Trade," issued in June by the U.S. Congress, points out the major resistance to control of arms exports comes first from the bureaucratic apparatus of the U.S. Government itself and from U.S. munitions dealers. The United States shoulders heavy responsibilities for the proliferation of conventional weapons across the world. It not only exports weapons, but also transfers military technologies and weapons production technologies to other countries, with the result that the production technologies of advanced weapons have been spread across the world to a serious degree. The report says that in 1988, the United States transferred production technologies for 70 advanced weapons, which nearly equaled the total weapons technology transfers by other NATO members and the Soviet Union combined.

Since West European countries are beginning to reduce military spending, West Europe's munitions dealers will proceed to overseas markets. The United States, therefore, reckons that in the future it will start a more acute struggle with West Europe for the Third World munitions market, especially that of the oil-abundant Middle East. The U.S. Defense Information Center predicted that U.S. arms exports and military aid to other countries in the 1991 fiscal year probably would reach \$41 billion. On the other hand, a U.S. Congress report says the U.S. Government is planning to export \$14.5 billion of ammunition to Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the United States' repeated appeals for arms control are really intended for others rather than itself.

North Korean Statement on NFZ Proposal Reported

OW2708044891 Beijing XINHUA in English
0427 GMT 27 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, August 27 (XINHUA)—A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) said Monday his country is

ready to talk at any time and at any level with South Korea to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ], the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA) reported.

The DPRK's Foreign Ministry issued a statement on July 30 suggesting that the North and South consult and jointly declare their peninsula as a nuclear-free zone, and also demanded an international pledge on this issue from such peripheral nuclear countries as the U.S., the USSR and China.

It was reported that the U.S. "adopted a positive attitude" toward this suggestion. Not long ago, the South Korean regime said they would agree to discuss the nuclear problem on the peninsula if the DPRK accepted a complete inspection of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The spokesman said that the U.S. and South Korea, which had always objected to a de-nuclearization of the peninsula, had "a certain change" in their attitude which "makes it possible for consultations" and is "worthy of celebration."

The U.S. is responsible for taking a more positive stance towards eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons, such as by removing nuclear arsenals from the Korean peninsula, the spokesman stressed.

South Korea should put national interests above anything else, and consult and proclaim with the North on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula, he added.

He hoped that consultations on that issue would be held as soon as possible between the U.S., South Korea and the DPRK, which he thought would "bring a bright prospect for the realization of the de-nuclearization of the peninsula."

U.S. Rejects Yeltsin Call for Nuclear Test Ban

*OW0409005091 Beijing XINHUA in English
0026 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[Text] Washington, September 3 (XINHUA)—The United States rejected today a proposal by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to stop nuclear tests.

"The United States has always taken the position that as long as we possess nuclear weapons we have to retain the ability to test them," said Pete Williams, spokesman for the U.S. Defense Department.

Interviewed on CNN earlier today, Russian President Yeltsin said he favored a complete elimination of nuclear weapons on earth and as the first step, he called on the United States and all other nuclear powers to stop tests of nuclear weapons.

Williams argued that the United States needed continued nuclear testing to maintain the safety of existing nuclear weapons and to design new, safer ones.

"Part of our ability to improve the safety, and change the design of nuclear weapons to make them safer, is contingent upon our maintaining a testing program," the spokesman said. "So we take the position that we have to be able to continue to test nuclear weapons as long as we have them."

NORTH KOREA

Memorandum of 'Anti-Nuke' Committee Published

SK1608053191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0401 GMT 16 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, August 16 (KCNA)—The Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee and the Korean National Peace Committee published a memorandum on August 15 urging the United States and the South Korean authorities to accede without delay to the DPRK's proposal for negotiations to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

The memorandum was published at a time when plan-
etwide voices demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone was growing louder. It recalls that the governments, political parties and organizations of more than 100 countries on the five continents, some 20 international organizations and hundreds of prominent political and public figures have taken various steps on more than 1,000 occasions including the publication of statements and appeals and meetings in the last few months since the joint statement of the DPRK political parties and public organizations was published on June 10.

According to the memorandum, broad public circles of the world unanimously exposed the danger of the U.S. nuclear weapons and demanded a simultaneous nuclear inspection of the North and the South, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

18 political parties and organizations of Pakistan in a joint statement on July 4, 1991, said although the United States is loudmouthed about "the end of cold war," the more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea pose a threat to peace and security not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Asia.

Delegates of 17 political parties including the communist party of India, the Pakistan People's Party, the Communist Party of Paraguay, the Chilean Socialist Party, the United Party of Haitian Communists, the Peruvian Communist Party and the African National Congress of South Africa in a joint statement published on June 17, 1991 pointed out that the United States has deployed more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons and 40,000 troops in South Korea and is ceaselessly staging such provocative and aggressive nuclear games as "Team Spirit" joint military exercises with the mobilization of huge armed forces.

25 political parties in Latin America and Europe including the Communist Party of Argentina, the Belgian Labour Party, the Colombian Communist Party, the Ecuadoran human rights committee, the Honduran Communist Party, the Mexican Democratic Revolutionary Party and the Central American united party in

a joint statement on July 21 1991 held that if the United States truly want peace, it should not demand a "nuclear inspection" of the DPRK alone which has no nuclear arms but open to the public the nuclear weapons of its forces in South Korea and, at the same time, accept an international inspection of them.

Delegates of the German Communist Party, the Jordanian People's Democratic Party, the Salvadoran Communist Party and others in a joint statement on July 7 1991 demanded that the United States respond without delay to the call for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, saying if it has no intention to threaten Korea and other Asian countries with nuclear weapons, it should immediately withdraw all its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

Vladimir Fedotov, ambassador of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in charge of special affairs, speaking at the Asia-Pacific roundtable conference on confidence-building and removal of disputes in the Pacific on June 10 1991, contended that the United States must give assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against the DPRK and must withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea is continually ringing out from the United States and from among the Koreans overseas.

Prof. Robert Scalapino, former director of the East Asia institute of California University who is a U.S. expert on Asian affairs, told a meeting sponsored by the U.S. Asian association on July 1 that there is no need for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea if it is merely for security reasons. He urged the U.S. administration to reexamine its nuclear policy on the Korean peninsula.

Selig Harrison of the high institute of the U.S. Carnegui [spelling as received] Foundation, in an article contributed to the U.S. paper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR on July 4 held that the United States should promise not to use or deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula for the sake of peace.

The memorandum stresses in concluding:

The days are gone never to return when the United States could frighten and hold sway over the world with nuclear weapons.

It is a foolish daydream if the United States thinks it can get something while keeping its nuclear weapons in South Korea and continually pursuing its policy of nuclear threat.

The United States and the South Korean authorities must accede without delay to our Republic's proposal for negotiations to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

If they refuse again our fair and aboveboard proposal, they would bump into fiercer condemnation from all the Korean people in the North and the South and the world's peaceloving people.

Joint Denuclearization Forum Held in Japan

SK1708053691 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0441 GMT 17 Aug 91

[Text] Tokyo, August 15 (KNS-KCNA)—The Korean national peace committee delegation on a visit to Japan and the Japanese people's council against A-H bombs held a joint forum on "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the peace movement in Japan" in Tokyo on August 12.

Yasuhiro Maeta, editor of MAINICHI SHIMBUN, in his speech noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hopes for a world without nuclear weapons and has consistently pursued a policy to this end. For Japan to normalize diplomatic relations with this country will be a decisive occasion in realizing peace and security in Northeast Asia, he said, and stressed:

The Japanese people must lend an ear to the appeal of the people of the DPRK who desire to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and only then can Japan be freed from the "U.S.-style view on value" and take first step toward peace in Asia.

An appeal adopted at the forum, referring to the new proposal of the DPRK Government to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, called upon the Japanese people to fully support such activity of the DPRK and make efforts for an early normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK according to the joint declaration of the three parties.

Denuclearization Said 'Burning Issue' for Peace

SK2008120691 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1036 GMT 20 Aug 91

["Denuclearization on Korean Peninsula Is Burning Issue for World Peace"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, August 20 (KCNA)—If the United States continue to turn away from the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, it would be unable to escape fiercer condemnations and rejection as a wrecker of world peace and security, says NODONG SINMUN today in a by-lined article entitled "Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula Is a Burning Issue for World Peace."

The article reads in part:

What is important in the struggle to create nuclear-free zones is to realize denuclearization, to begin with, in the area fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has said:

"To make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone is essential to maintaining and consolidating peace in Korea and to guaranteeing peace in Asia and the rest of the world."

To turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is a very urgent question in guaranteeing peace in Asia and the rest of the world. Because the most dangerous hotbed of nuclear war can be removed only when the Korean peninsula is denuclearized.

The South of the Korean peninsula is the place where the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war moves are becoming most pronounced at present.

Nearly all types of nuclear weapons produced by the U.S. imperialists have been deployed in South Korea. They number more than 1,000 pieces.

The U.S. imperialists simplified the procedures of use of nuclear weapons in South Korea, worked out even a "120-day war plan" presupposing the use of nuclear weapons and are staging nuclear war games almost every day.

Their attempts to ignite a nuclear war in Korea is connected with their ambition for world domination. They think if they bring the Korean peninsula under their control they can realize without difficulty the ambition for domination over Asia and the rest of the world, let alone its neighbouring countries.

If a war breaks out in Korea under such conditions, it would immediately turn into a nuclear war and then our people and the other Asian peoples as well would suffer a nuclear holocaust.

Denuclearization on the Korean peninsula envisages banning the testing, production and possession of nuclear weapons and prohibiting the deployment and passage of nuclear weapons and military exercises within its territory. It also premises the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Our party and the government of our republic put forward proposals to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and are making strenuous efforts to carry them into practice. Some time ago, too, the government of our republic advanced a new proposal for denuclearization on the Korean peninsula through a statement made by the Foreign Ministry.

What stand and attitude they adopt regarding the question of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula today is a touchstone showing whether they want peace or not.

Cuban Foreign Ministry Supports Denuclearization

SK2308054191 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0453 GMT 23 Aug 91

[Text] Havana, August 21 (KCNA)—The Cuban paper GRANMA August 20 carried a statement issued by a

spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Cuba in support of the statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea containing a new proposal of its government for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula under the title "Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula".

It said that it is one of the greatest interests and ardent desires of mankind in the present period to reduce nuclear weapons and remove their threat from the globe.

Noting that Cuba has always opposed mass destruction weapons, especially nuclear weapons, it stressed:

Proceeding from this policy, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Cuba considers denuclearization on the Korean peninsula to be greatly conducive to ensuring peace and security in the world and expresses most steadfast support to the DPRK's proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Kathmandu Conference Expresses Support for Korean NFZ

Letter to Kim Il-song

*SK2308051091 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0423 GMT 23 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 23 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song received a letter from the participants in the conference of political parties and public organizations for denuclearization of Korean peninsula against U.S. nuclear threat to Asia which was held in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The letter stressed that it is the most pressing task for the Asian people to denuclearize, in firm unity, the Korean peninsula fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war, accelerate the independent, peaceful reunification of Korea and remove the tension in Northeast Asia.

The 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed by the United States in the southern half of the Korean peninsula not only threaten the existence of the Korean people but also constitute the main source of menace to peace and security in Asia, the letter said, and went on:

We scathingly denounce the unilateral arbitrary attempt of the United States to force nuclear inspection on the northern half of Korea which has no intention or capacity to manufacture nuclear arms and is ready to sign the Nuclear Safeguards accord any time according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And we strongly demand that the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea be made public and an international inspection of them made at the same time.

We hold that the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and the method of reunification through confederation based

on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments, which were clarified by Your Excellency president, indicate a correct, straight way for hastening Korea's reunification.

The letter wholeheartedly wished President Kim Il-song good health and long life.

Letter to Kim Chong-il

*SK2308101691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0958 GMT 23 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 23 (KCNA)—The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il received a letter from the participants in the conference of political parties and public organizations for denuclearization of Korean peninsula against U.S. nuclear threat to Asia which was held in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The letter stressed that the Asian people in firm unity should get the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons taken out of South Korea and make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone [NFZ] in order to build an independent and prosperous new Asia.

The letter said:

We denounce it as unilateral, big-power arbitrariness of the United States to insist on inspection of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that has no single nuclear weapon. And we strongly demand that the United States open to the public the nuclear weapons it has introduced into South Korea and accept simultaneous international inspection of them.

Considering that the method of reunification through confederation based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments, which was clarified by respected President Kim Il-song, is a most correct and realistic way of the independent reunification of Korea, we fully support it.

We demand that the United States discard its anachronistic Korea policy and come to DPRK-U.S. talks for concluding a peace treaty and the North and the South of Korea adopt a non-aggression declaration and remove confrontation.

The letter heartily wished Comrade Kim Chong-il a long life in good health.

Korean CP Official Addresses Meeting

*SK2308052291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0428 GMT 23 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 23 (KCNA)—Kim Chae-pong, head of the delegation of the Workers' Party of Korea, made a supplementary report at the conference of political parties and public organizations for denuclearization of Korean peninsula against U.S. Nuclear threat to Asia which was held in Nepal.

To prevent the danger of nuclear war and ensure durable peace on the Korean peninsula is not only vital for the

survival of the Korean nation but also directly linked with the improvement of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and guarantee of global peace and security, he said, and went on:

Tension is growing acute and the danger of nuclear war is increasing on the Korean peninsula. This is a direct outcome of the U.S. Korea policy and Asia strategy.

By the U.S. strategy toward Korea, South Korea has been turned into the largest nuclear military base in the Far East, where more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. troops more than 40,000 strong have been deployed and 40 underground nuclear vaults been built.

The United States continues shipping into South Korea various kinds of nuclear missiles and binary chemical weapons and building nuclear airforce bases and large-scale storehouses for nuclear bombs.

Declaring that the "second Korean war will be a nuclear war", the United States has worked out a plan for a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and is ceaselessly staging nuclear military exercises of all forms.

Worse still, the power to use nuclear arms on the Korean peninsula is in the hand of the commander of the U.S. forces occupying South Korea, unlike the case in other parts of the world.

The U.S. claim that it has deployed them to protect South Korea from the "threat of southward invasion" is a lie to justify its moves of aggression.

It is clear that more than 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea by the United States are after all aimed at threatening and bringing under its control the Asian people and dominating the whole territory of Korea and Asia.

No one can vouch that the United States, which is invariably pursuing the policy of strength in Asia, will not use nuclear weapons against the countries in the region under some pretext.

On several occasions, the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward the proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone and peace zone in Northeast Asia. Notably, the DPRK in December 1985 joined the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and, according to the idea of the treaty, proposed to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone. This proceeds from the anti-nuclear peace idea.

The United States is now making a noise about our non-existent nuclear facilities and "nuclear inspection." It is an excuse to cover up the danger of nuclear weapons in South Korea and justify the policy of nuclear blackmail.

If the nuclear inspection is to be made, it should not be forced upon us alone with no nuclear weapons, but the

U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea should be opened to the public and an international inspection of them made at the same time.

The U.S. and South Korean authorities must accept the DPRK's proposal for three-way talks for ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and take measures to pull the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons out of South Korea.

We will make persevering efforts to further develop dialogue between the North and the South for settling the issue of national reunification and surmount the difficulties and obstacles in the way of reunification.

Keynote Address by Nepal CP Head

SK2308103291 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1003 GMT 23 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, August 23 (KCNA)—Man Mohan Adhikary, president of the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxism-Leninism), made a keynote report titled "On Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Removing U.S. Nuclear Threat From Asian Region" at the conference of political parties and public organizations for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula against U.S. nuclear threat to Asia which was held in Nepal.

The reporter said that ushering in the 1980's the U.S. Administration defined the Asia-Pacific region as the main target in implementing its strategy for global domination and reinforced the nuclear armed forces in the region, while stepping up the policy of war.

He continued:

The United States is working to dominate the whole of Korea and the Asian continent by using South Korea as a stepping stone.

Having defined South Korea as the "an directly linked with the U.S. security" and "the first line of U.S. strategy", the United States has largely reinforced its strategic weapons including nuclear arms in South Korea, while staging nuclear war exercises unceasingly. [sentence as received]

According to the U.S. Korea strategy, more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons have been deployed in South Korea which is not large land.

The "Team Spirit," U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises are a test nuclear war to quickly hurl on to the Korean front huge armed forces present in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland and attack the DPRK and other Asian countries.

In its bid to establish and maintain its supremacy in Asia, the United States will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons under some pretext.

Recalling that the DPRK has made constructive proposals and taken initiatives on many occasions for peace and reunification of Korea including a proposal for

founding the democratic confederal republic of Koryo, a proposal for tripartite talks and a proposal for the denuclearization and peace of the Korean peninsula, he went on:

The United States is now crying over non-existent "nuclear facilities" of the DPRK and insisting on unfair "nuclear inspection" in a bid to cover up the danger of the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and justify its policy of nuclear blackmail.

It is necessary for all the political parties and public organizations in Asia to conduct vigorous activities for putting an end to arms race, having nuclear weapons and foreign military bases removed and preventing the formation of a new military bloc on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia.

Activities should be conducted to encourage the peace-loving people in their struggle for establishing nuclear-free zones and peace zones in northeast Asia, the Pacific and other parts.

It is necessary for all the political parties and social organizations to expose the unfair demand of the United States for unilateral "nuclear inspection" and put pressure on the United States to discharge its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons.

Peoples, political parties and social organizations in Asia should form a united front, closely unite under the banner of anti-imperialism, independence, anti-war and peace, transcending the differences in ideology, social system and religious belief, and jointly counter the imperialists' policy of aggression and nuclear war provocation moves.

Foreign Ministry Statement on NFZ, U.S. Stance

SK2608045091 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0300 GMT 26 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, 26 August—Concerning the position of the United States and the South Korean authorities on the 31 July DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, which states the Republic's Government's new proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone [NFZ], the Foreign Ministry spokesman issued the following press statement.

Press statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman:

The DPRK Foreign Ministry released a statement last 31 July stating a new proposal for realizing the cause of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Because it contained realistic and practical measures for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, this proposal has been widely supported and sympathized with at home and abroad. Even the U.S. State Department has recently taken an affirmative, not negative, stand on it, and the South Korean Foreign Ministry, too, hinted at agreeing to discussing our proposal, though on conditions, through the mouth of its spokesman.

The fact is that the United States and the South Korean authorities have recognized our principled position and assertions on realizing the cause of converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, as it is considered that some changes have occurred in their attitude of stubbornly opposing the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

In particular, because the U.S. treatment of our proposal with a relatively affirmative response can possibly provide a possibility for negotiations over the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, we find it a fortunate turn of event.

Because the United States is practically responsible for the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea and is their owner, it is directly responsible for taking more forward-looking measures, such as removing the nuclear danger from the Korean peninsula and withdrawing the nuclear weapons from there.

In believing that North and South Korea should jointly agree to and declare the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula by placing the national interest ahead of everything else, transcending the differences in ideologies and systems, we once again confirm that we are fully ready to negotiate with the South Korean side over this issue at any level and at any time.

We insist that the United States and the South Korean authorities come to the negotiation table with us at the earliest possible date if they genuinely hope to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

The Republic's Government is convinced that if negotiations are conducted on this, a bright prospect can be opened for realizing the cause of converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Foreign Minister on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Issue

*LD2208173991 Warsaw PAP in English 1517 GMT
22 Aug 91*

[Text] Warsaw, August 22—Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski refused on Thursday to answer a question about possible consequences of the failed coup in the Soviet Union but stressed that he would like Polish-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of troops and signing of a new treaty to be more conclusive.

"In my opinion at the moment an atmosphere may be created that will be better for settling these issues that have been long waiting for a solution. The delaying of the issue of a treaty on the pullout of troops by the Soviet Union does not meet the requirements of our good relations and does not lie in the broader interest of peaceful development in Europe," he stated.

Skubiszewski added that a new treaty between the two countries cannot be based on old models and reflect an influence made by a superpower on a weaker partner but must follow the CSCE principles in 100 per cent.

Asked about Poland's attitude towards the announcement of independence by Latvia and Estonia, the foreign minister said: "Poland supports the aspirations of these republics. I expressed this support during my talk with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas on Wednesday."

Soviet Army Withdrawal Talks Continue

*LD2208194791 Warsaw PAP in English 1635 GMT
22 Aug 91*

[Text] Warsaw, August 22—Head of Polish delegation to the negotiations on Soviet Army withdrawal Jerzy Sulek reported on Thursday that the talks of the second day of the 11th stage of negotiations focused on the deadline for Soviet Army withdrawal, dates and requirements for individual military transports and financial settlements.

Jerzy Sulek said that little progress was made in the financial field and added that a special group was set up to fix taxes and establish customs fees for Soviet property taken out of Poland.

Meanwhile, on Thursday afternoon, another Soviet transport taking away communications equipment and some 330 soldiers and officials left from Bialogard to Braniewo, a northern Polish city bordering on the USSR.

It is expected that the remaining soldiers and officials of the communications battalion will leave Poland on Tuesday, August 26. However, the deadlines for the withdrawal of other military units stationing in Bialogard are still not settled.

Meanwhile, a group of Polish geology experts from Szczecin (north-western Poland) that was supposed to examine oil contamination was refused entry to a Soviet naval base in Swinoujscie and air bases in Kluczew and Chojny (Szczecin Province) on Thursday.

Third Transport of Soviet Soldiers Withdraws

*LD2608224591 Warsaw PAP in English 1759 GMT
26 Aug 91*

[Text] Warsaw, August 26—A third transport of Soviet soldiers left the northern Polish town of Bialogard on Monday.

The transport of 25 carriages carrying 300 soldiers and officers of the communications battalion left the town while other Soviet units still remained there.

The train with Soviet soldiers and equipment will cross the Polish border in Kuznica Bialostocka.

Meanwhile, a unit of northern group of the Soviet army has been withdrawn from Strzegom, south-west Poland. Four buildings left by the Soviets will be sold by tender, while barracks, garages and filling stations will be taken over by workers of the health service and education.

Soviet Base at Czarna To Be Vacated 'This Year'

*LD3108102591 Warsaw PAP in English 1516 GMT
30 Aug 91*

[Text] Tarnow, August 30—The Soviet Government's plenipotentiary for USSR troops stationed in Poland notified the Polish side that the Soviet base situated in the locality of Czarna in the Tarnow Province, south-east Poland will be turned over to Poland this year, the Tarnow provincial office reported Friday.

Only three months earlier the command of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army claimed it would not be possible to remove Soviet troops from Czarna earlier than by the end of 1993. A communications unit was said to be stationed there to maintain contacts between the Soviet troops in the former East Germany and the southern part of the Soviet Union.

CUBA

Envoy Discusses Nuclear, Chemical Disarmament

*FL2308001891 Havana Radio Reloj Network
in Spanish 1952 GMT 22 Aug 91*

[Text] Cuba has alerted the UN Nuclear Disarmament Conference of the persistence of the threat of nuclear explosions due to deficiencies or technical negligence. The Cuban stance was presented to the participants of the meeting by Ambassador Jose Perez Novoa, who made a detailed analysis of the text and negotiations concerning the chemical arms convention.

The Cuban diplomat said that it is surprising that some of the major and most important countries that have chemical and nuclear weapons call for the immediate elimination of the agreement, but they do not make demands for the prompt elimination of atomic arms and their new technologies with the same passion.

The Cuban diplomat added: My government believes that a prompt resolution of an agreement on a chemical

arms convention, even if it is only a partial one within the framework of a more complex general disarmament, would be an achievement.

Perez Novoa stressed in Geneva the initiatives implemented by his country on security issues, among which is the creation of a list of installations that consume chemical substances in the country that would be subjected to control by the convention.

He also expressed satisfaction on the curtailment of the right to retaliate after remembering the obstacles that had delayed the negotiations for years— in particular, the U.S.' insistence of upholding the protocol on the right to retaliate and 2 percent of the chemical arsenals.

He added: We would be happier if it had been the result of multilateral negotiations in the conference and not of bilateral agreements, which we welcome because undoubtedly they are a new step in the right direction.

With respect to verification, the Cuban ambassador indicated that the best system could not be perfect but a balance needs to be found to make it reliable.

INDIA

Editorial Views Bush-Gorbachev Summit, START

BK0908102891 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 2 Aug 91 p 11

[Editorial: "One-and-a-Half Summit"]

[Text] The treaty signed at Moscow between U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to reduce their strategic weapons by 30 per cent was in fact a tea party where they decided to back up anyone not on their list who dares to have an atom bomb or a missile. What they intend to do about the audacious was clear in Mr Gorbachev's assertion that what was of key importance was to create "an insurmountable barrier to acquiring nuclear weapons." That the two leaders could easily formalise the START treaty was a result of the ground work which their Foreign Ministers, Mr Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Mr James Baker, did at their meeting in Washington a few weeks ago. Our planet has not become an abode of peace after the agreement. The U.S. and the Soviet Union continue to possess enough strategic weapons to destroy the world. According to defence experts, the START treaty does not eliminate the risk of war, though it reduces the risk. Therefore, the most cheerful view of the summit is that the START treaty makes the trigger fingers on both sides less itchy. Since in a very real sense the balance of terror continues to ensure peace between the two most potential destroyers of the planet, one can only take a cynical view of the achievements of the Moscow summit. Of course, one big gain for Mr Gorbachev is to steer his country's Reaganian definition of an evil empire to Mr Bush's most favoured nation (MFN).

But, one suspects, Mr Gorbachev's driving urge to please Mr Bush is not just to make his weapons less threatening to the West. He must get the West's capital and technology, and he is prepared to pay a price for that. And, that, apparently is his enthusiastic support for the American programme to limit nuclear and missile capability. The world may get a very wrong message from a US-Soviet agreement to limit nuclear-blessed big power status to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. These powers have been just frills in a bipolar syndrome. Of the two real actors, Moscow has retired hurt. The nuclear proliferation question is a global issue which Moscow apparently is ready to consign to Washington. However totally global a Moscow-Washington summit may claim to be, it is no longer true that Mr Bush and Mr Gorbachev have between themselves all the cares of the world. Therefore, their summit today should be seen for what it is: a meeting between one and a half super powers. If Mr Bush wishes to push his nuclear and missile nonproliferation programme, he must seek an endorsement beyond Moscow. Not only has the United Nations to be more representative of today's realpolitik, the U.S. itself must recognise that global decisions and directions would be more valid if he transcends the Big Two power framework and takes into account newly

emerged powers like Germany and Japan and middle powers like India, Brazil and some others.

Editorial Calls START Treaty Major Step Forward

91WC0159 Madras THE HINDU in English
2 Aug 91 p 8

[Editorial: "Yet Another Milestone"]

[Text] Mr. George Bush and Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev may not have fully achieved what the two countries had set out to do in 1982, but the fact that an accord has been initialled on reducing strategic nuclear weapons is undoubtedly yet another milestone in bilateral relations. And looking at it in an international perspective, the Moscow summit does augur well for the easing of tensions in many troubled parts of the world. When the former American President, Mr. Ronald Reagan, came up with this business of "reductions" in the long range arsenals, it was thought at that time that both the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to come to an understanding on a 50 per cent cut, but the negotiations in the last two years showed how far apart the teams were in deciding the overall limits and sub-ceilings. This, however, is not to suggest that the 30 per cent arms cut is insignificant: the top powers will have 4,900 ballistic missiles each, with the Soviet Union agreeing to a 35 per cent cut in its strategic warheads as opposed to the United States 25 per cent, besides agreed limits on the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The first real cut in the long range nuclear weapons category means that both Washington and Moscow have at their disposal enough weapons to destroy each other several times over in the event of a showdown, but political events in the last few years have been positive and optimistic. The hope now is that the top powers will see the outcome of the Moscow summit as only a first step in making the world a safer place to live.

If the agreement on strategic weapons has been generally welcomed in the Western world and elsewhere much of it has to do with the feeling that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken a major step forward in putting the five decades of mistrust behind them. But in looking at the "controls" some would be tempted to argue that the two countries have not really broken fully with the past. The overall fact is that the top powers have moved away from confrontation to one of looking at the issues in a straightforward and businesslike fashion. The confidence building measures that have been taken over a period of time have paid off to the point that neither Moscow nor Washington look at each other as automatic adversaries in international politics and nation-state behaviour. Of course hardliners in both the countries would be accusing their leaders of having given away "too much", and in an immediate context, the problems are more for Mr. Gorbachev than for Mr. Bush. The anti-Gorbachev elements in the Communist Party and in the bureaucracy accuse the Soviet leader of being too soft on foreign policy issues. And this is precisely why Mr.

Bush remarked in Moscow that no side "won" any unilateral advantage over the other in the signing of the START treaty.

The United States and the Soviet Union have moved closer in the bilateral relationship, particularly as it pertains to nuclear weapons reductions. And the focus from now on will be on whether this by itself translates into other areas. That Mr. Gorbachev is going through some troubled times is for all to see—economically the country is in bad shape and the Soviet leader is going the

distance in convincing the West and Japan of the urgent need to bail him out, but not through easy handouts. This is yet another opportunity for the West to look beyond defence and nuclear issues and see how it could help the Soviet Union at a critical point in the political and economic process in postponing a vital decision or in insisting that a "lot more" needs to be done before a meaningful assistance package could be granted to the Soviet Union, the industrialised nations stand to lose. The international community as a whole stands to benefit if Mr. Gorbachev succeeds in his efforts.

GENERAL**END Holds Moscow Disarmament Convention**

*PM2908090991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4*

[By Vikentiy Matveyev: "Nuclear Disarmament Convention in Moscow"]

[Text] Brussels, West Berlin, Perugia, Amsterdam, Paris, Coventry, Lund, Victoria, Helsinki and Tallinn, and now Moscow: These are the venues for convention meetings of the international anti-war organization known as the Movement for European Nuclear Disarmament, or by the English abbreviation END.

Representatives of the public from no fewer than 30 countries plus delegates from 50 foreign nongovernmental organizations gathered here. Besides the plenary sessions, during the four days of the conference (14-17 August), sections, groups, and roundtables were at work. Representatives of our public also took an active part in them.

How should the struggle for disarmament be conducted in light of the great changes in our planet's expanses? This was the main theme during the lively and at times stormy debates that took place at the forum.

Only recently masses of people took to the streets and squares with a more or less specific idea of to whom and to which governments they should address their demands to begin the disarmament process. Now to propound such slogans is to force one's way to gates which are no longer blocked. Reality has superseded many of the peace campaigners' intentions. Maybe in that case they should declare a moratorium on their activities? Of course, it is understandable that nobody at the convention mentioned this at all. Without work, neither END nor other peace movements will be left in existence.

Although the mounting global problems—ecology, energy, demography—will not disappear from the mass demonstrations, their solution requires other methods and actions. The voices of foreign "Greens" and our "Let Us Save the World and Nature" association spoke up loudly and convincingly at the convention. Which is as it should be.

Nuclear disarmament remains the main aim of the ambassadors of youth (and there was a particularly large number of them), the intelligentsia, trade unions, churches, parliaments, academics, and culture who participated in this meeting, and it was no accident that the hope that our country and its leadership will also remain loyal to the struggle for a nonnuclear world was expressed from the convention platform. At the moment not everyone in END's ranks is sure—let us note—that we are so resolved.

As yet it is too early to say that we have already succeeded in curbing the arms race, many speeches stressed. Thus, during examination of the Gulf War's consequences, the almost unanimous opinion emerged that the center of gravity in the design and production of weapons has now shifted to the latest technology, including space technology. Severe criticism of U.S. policy was voiced in this connection. And our country was even mentioned together with the United States as also being responsible for the indiscriminate trade in arms.

Of course, the key theme was Europe and the role of peace movements in the formation of its future. Positive changes are indisputable, but new and alarming phenomena have also emerged. In the section that was discussing the prospects for democratization on the continent many speakers, including FRG Bundestag member Gert Weisskirchen, pointed out the danger of the rise of neofascism and chauvinism unless the current gulf between living standards in West and East Europe is bridged.

At a plenary sitting the eminent public figure Chiara Ingrao (Italy) stated that Europe does not need the "rapid reaction forces" planned by NATO but does need to avoid crises similar to the present one in Yugoslavia.

END did not focus exclusively on Europe. The voices of representatives from Asia and Africa spoke up loudly from the convention platform. The section on the Near East was at work. In a closing address John Lambert, one of END's founders, reported an action scheduled for the beginning of October. In the capitals where there are embassies of Israel and Arab countries, to make a "human chain" between them—a symbol of the link and the intercourse without which there can be no peace in the Near East.

Three main tasks for the near future were formulated for END at the forum: To act in the name of disarmament, civil rights, and securing the rights of any and all nationalities. He stated that the Moscow convention is historic in the full sense: In fact there was no West or East at the convention but, instead, that panhuman commonality was established there which opens up the greatest hope for mankind's future.

The next END meeting will take place in Brussels at the beginning of July 1992.

Disarmament Talks To Continue on Schedule

*OW2608173491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1640 GMT 26 Aug 91*

["Diplomatic Panorama" report by M. Mayorov and I. Porshnev; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Soviet Foreign Ministry is resolved to comply with the agreed schedule of arms control talks despite the recent events in the country. Diplomats at the ministry's Department for Arms Control and Disarmament said the

Soviet position in negotiations on strategic, conventional and other types of weapons had been defined by President Gorbachev and as such, remained in force. Soviet diplomats believe the USSR will comply with all previous agreements which in itself makes it impossible to halt the negotiating process on further arms reductions.

A high-ranking Soviet diplomat has dismissed suggestions that a credibility gap appeared in the Soviet-U.S. relations and that the START treaty signed in Moscow last July might [be] difficult to implement. "I believe both sides are interested in the implementation of the treaty", a leading official from the arms control and disarmament department said, "it is another matter that the treaty should be ratified as soon as possible".

According to a previously agreed schedule, the negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe will be resumed in Vienna on September 2. In the same month, Soviet and American experts will meet in Geneva to discuss problems relating to nuclear and space-based arms. In October, Geneva is expected to become a venue for the so-called consultations on negotiations aimed to determine ways and numerical limits of further cuts in offensive strategic weapons as a follow-up to the Moscow treaty.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the USSR said, the United States has sent no signals indicating that it would like to change this schedule. Nor has the Soviet Union. Officials at the arms control and disarmament department have confirmed that throughout the 72 hours of the abortive coup or afterwards U.S. officials did not express their concern over what was taking place in the USSR, even though there were signs of a split in the army and of some rocket launchers (for example, a submarine of the Pacific fleet) going over from one jurisdiction to another.

'Justifiable Fears' Over Nuclear Controls Raised

LD0109022691 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 29 Aug 91

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] A host of painful issues is now coming to the fore as the prospect of the Soviet Union's disintegration becomes ever more real. One is who will be in charge of Soviet nuclear stockpiles. Commentary is by Aleksandr Pogodin and this is what he writes:

This is all the more important given the newly emerging situation in the country in the wake of last week's failed coup. The president of France's Fund for National Defense Studies, Pierre Debasisse, said that amid general chaos there was no firm guarantee of Soviet nuclear weapons being seized by the republics. [sentence as heard]

Britain's ITN network reports many Western diplomats increasingly speak of nightmarish scenarios whereby several nuclear powers may emerge instead of one as

before. The United States Administration is also said to be fearing that the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal may fall into the hands of separate republics.

For his part, President Francois Mitterrand raised serious concern over who'll be in charge of Soviet nuclear arms after a number of republics break away from Moscow. He's worried that the republics may lay their hands on bombs as powerful as one or two Hiroshimas.

Similar anxieties can be heard these days in the Soviet parliament now sitting in Moscow.

The prospect is indeed appalling, to say the least. How does Moscow appraise the situation?

The Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, speaking after talks with President Gorbachev, said the issue would come under discussion by the National Security Council with republican leaders taking part.

Mr. Yeltsin said the country's nuclear weapons were deployed in three Soviet republics—Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Following the Ukraine's declaration of denuclearizing itself, the weapons would be redeployed in the Russian Federation.

To allay fears, the Soviet Chief of Staff, General Lobov, said long-range and tactical weapons were under stringent control, including appropriate technical and arrangement measures, reliable protection and defense of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles which would help deter unauthorized use of nuclear arms.

It's to be hoped that such weighty statements can help ease justifiable fears over a possible proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons.

International Monitoring of Nuclear Arms Urged

PM0309130991 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Report over video read by announcer]

[Text] Today, the fate of Soviet nuclear forces is the focus of attention for political observers and the media. The Soviet Union possesses a massive nuclear arsenal. The country has approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, and the vast majority of launchers of nuclear-equipped ballistic missiles are located on Russian Federation territory. But hundreds of missiles are located outside its borders, notably in the republics which have already declared their independence from the USSR. Given the internal instability and the accelerating disintegration process and breakup of the Union, a whole range of questions arises: Who will control this nuclear monster? Who has his finger on the launching button? In the event of USSR Armed Forces' being

broken up into independent republic armies, what fate awaits the nuclear weapons? Finally, are there any security guarantees? In the opinion of USSR Presidential Adviser Yevgeniy Velikhov, the Supreme Soviet should hold an independent inquiry into the state of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The academician suggests setting up a special international organ to monitor USSR nuclear weapons.

Need for Improved Nuclear Safeguards Highlighted

*PM3008081891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5*

[V. Matveyev "Political Observer's Opinion": "The Nuclear Factor"]

[Text] It is no surprise that the question of the future of the nuclear arsenal in our country has arisen at this time. This aspect of our domestic situation has caused growing concern among the governments of a number of countries. As is known, there were enquiries to Moscow from Washington regarding the reliability of the nuclear weapons control procedure in conditions of growing instability in the USSR. Judging by reports in the U.S. media, the U.S. administration was given assurances by our side that nuclear weapons were under control in the USSR, with continuing observance of all the requisite conditions and procedures providing the necessary safety. Moreover—which was just as important—it was pointed out that the authorities in the USSR had taken steps to remove nuclear weapons from areas where proper control might be in doubt.

Now such assurances are no longer enough. This is evidenced by statements made during the current USSR Supreme Soviet session by a number of deputies.

It has been made public that for at least three days USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, as the supreme authority controlling the nuclear weapon triggers [rychagi], was rendered unable to perform these functions, because the triggers were in the hands of the putschists. Reports about this caused immediate concern abroad.

"One of the most horrible nightmares was beginning to be enacted," said Ted Taylor, former designer at the nuclear laboratory in Los Alamos, reacting to a report that the eight desperate conspirators were boarding an aircraft to leave Moscow. According to Taylor, he thought they were going to some remote area whence they might resort to nuclear blackmail or even worse. "I believe it was a very dangerous moment," Taylor added.

Fortunately, U.S. surveillance satellites were in operation and were able to establish that the status quo was being observed as far as nuclear missiles inside the USSR were concerned. It was on the basis of these data that President Bush said that despite the very acute situation in the USSR there were no grounds for concern regarding the possibility of any surprises in connection with Soviet nuclear weapons.

The U.S. president acted responsibly, but it is not clear what happened here at that critical time, and that is what our authoritative experts are saying.

Whatever the official representatives of military departments say about it, the fundamental aspect of the problem of nuclear weapons in our country is their vast numbers (if you count tactical warheads) and also the fact that they are scattered over a wide area. It is this aspect that has been pointed out in the past couple of years by many worried experts and specialists abroad, stressing the danger that threatens the USSR and the outside world in conditions of growing political destabilization here.

A few weeks ago it was this danger that prompted former CIA director Stansfield Turner to propose that the United States, in order to encourage a similar step by the Soviet Union, effect a significant unilateral reduction of its nuclear arsenal, leaving itself with only an essential number of nuclear warheads. There was a positive reaction to this proposal in our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, but there the matter ended.

But despite the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the reduction of strategic armaments, Turner's proposal is still relevant. The treaty is to be implemented over seven years. This is too long a period for carrying out the necessary measures in our country to make control of nuclear weapons more reliable in the acute situation that has occurred, above all by significantly reducing the size of the actual arsenal. So we have to accelerate this process, irrespective of the way the United States treats the deadlines for cuts of its nuclear warheads and missiles.

According to experts, the remaining arsenals of these weapons in the USSR and the United States following the upcoming reductions will still be of a size that exceeds security and defense requirements. It is hard to imagine a madman, in the form of a government, daring to use nuclear weapons. After Chernobyl this is inconceivable. As for acts of terrorism, it would not be very difficult to devise an appropriate international procedure, within the UN framework, for swift and decisive action to prevent the worst from occurring.

The currently uncertain future of the Soviet Union should be another argument in favor of radical steps to safeguard security interests in the nuclear sphere in the light of the lessons of what has taken place and what could happen.

General Masimov on Integrity of Missile Forces

*PM3008082591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Aug 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Interview with Army General Yu. Masimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, by correspondent V. Litovkin; date and place of interview

not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Army General Yu. Maksimov: 'One Republic Cannot Maintain a Nuclear Shield'"]

[Text] The events of recent August days have given rise to a desire on the part of many republics to create their own national armies and even claims to a part of the country's Armed Forces. Is this possible? What would happen to our army and, in particular, the missile forces if they were divided up among individual states?

Our correspondent talked with Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces.

[Maksimov] It is my profound belief that only a renewed, single Union and our state's modern armed forces can ensure real sovereignty, independence, and security for the country as a whole and for each member republic. And vice versa. Without joint efforts by all the republics in our Union you cannot preserve a modern, battleworthy army as a guarantor of our peaceful life.

The Strategic Rocket Forces are my parish. I will talk about them. And my opinion is quite clear and unequivocal: splitting the Strategic Rocket Forces up along ethnic lines is out of the question. For a whole range of political, technical, military, and legal reasons.

Let me begin with the political. The missile forces are the foundation of the strategic nuclear forces and a decisive factor in deterring and preventing war. They must possess reliability, proper combat effectiveness, and the requisite potential for retaliatory action. Only then can they prevent any aggressor from being tempted to wage war on our country, to blackmail it or bring any strong-arm pressure to bear on it.

At the moment our forces are capable of doing that job; in a fragmented state they would never be able to do it.

It is also technically impossible. Why? Well, practically all the republics and their entire scientific and production personnel are involved. Take out one component and you could do irreparable damage.

Suffice it to say that a thousand related facilities, dozens and hundreds of enterprises which it would be impossible to locate or reestablish on one territory, even in Russia, are involved in creating one missile. Even Russia could not handle the job from the economic viewpoint.

No individual republic could ensure that its nuclear missiles were up to the demands of modern science and technology. Changes in this sphere are so rapid and the expenditure so huge that they would not be able to cope alone.

You have to have scientific research institutes and test sites—very complex and expensive facilities where missiles are not only tested and launched but undergo refinement and are monitored for safety in use. The test site cannot be located on the territory of a single republic. Not to mention the missile flight paths, which extend over a vast area.

The missile attack warning system and its components are located all over the country, but it is a unified system here. It is utterly impossible to talk about state security, about any possibility of retaliatory action without it.

Now I come to the military aspect. The missile forces need unified, centralized combat control, a unified system of security against unsanctioned actions [sistema obespecheniya nesanktsionirovannykh deystviy], that is, for guarding against the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, and a unified system to ensure nuclear safety.

We have put this system together over the years and the decades. And it is impossible today to break it up into separate parts. It would mean scrapping, destroying it. It would result in a threat to life on earth. I cannot imagine who would do that.

Finally—and this is no insignificant reason—our missile forces' facilities are situated in many republics, on all territories. This ensures their survivability.

For the Americans, the foundation of the strategic offensive nuclear forces is submarine-based ballistic missiles. They are in the wide expanses of the ocean; ours are on dry land. If you were to gather them together in one rather restricted area, their survivability and combat effectiveness would straightaway be radically reduced. Which is also unwise.

The legal aspect of the problem is also of no mean significance. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is prohibited by international treaties, and we also have no right to make it such that instead of one, USSR nuclear power we have two, three, six, or seven.

So whatever way you look at it, dividing up our branch of the Armed Forces is unthinkable and out of the question.

[Litovkin] But a republic like Russia—can't it afford to have its own nuclear forces?

[Maksimov] No, it is economically impossible even for Russia.

[Litovkin] But maybe some republic or other would have no need for missile forces at all. There are very many countries in the world that do not have them and do not suffer as a result.

[Maksimov] Quite possible. But I am talking about the security of our state, of its modern Armed Forces. No major country can really afford not to have them, not to try to make itself secure from any invasion.

That goes for our republics, too. Look, they have only just started talking about independence and straightaway the problem of borders arises. What would it be like if every republic had its own armed forces? Has Karabakh taught us nothing?

Indeed, in my view, the external security of borders could also be under threat. Few of our neighbors have no

territorial claims on us. The way they approach a fragmented Union, deprived of its missile shield, could be different from the way they approach a unified Union. The prospect worries me.

You also have the matter of national formations for the solution of some internal tasks—one might talk about that. And about the legal regulation of the presence of forces on the territory of the republics, the relationship between the military and the local authorities.... All these problems have to be resolved. But you cannot have a situation whereby each republic is using its own armed forces to ensure its own sovereignty and security. Nothing good would come of that.

[Litovkin] The final question is about something that worries us all today. What happened to our strategic nuclear forces during the 72 hours when the president was isolated? When was he deprived of any influence over them?

[Maksimov] I cannot give you a definitive answer to that. I do not know precisely what happened to the control facilities which are in the hands of the country's top leadership, and I cannot speculate.

One thing I can say is that there was no danger to peace at that time. I already mentioned the system for preventing the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. It rules out the possibility of a one-man decision. So in those circumstances there was no question of any blackmail or pressure.

I can add that during that period our forces did not participate in the fulfillment of SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] orders. I categorically forbade anyone to assign equipment and people for those purposes. The order was carried out.

What we did was step up the protection of ammunition depots, missile positions, and alert duty, and went about our day-to-day business.

The missile forces' weaponry is too serious for it to have become involved in adventures.

General Staff's Lobov on Nuclear Arms Control

*LD0509095991 Moscow TASS in English
0952 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovsky]

[Text] Moscow, September 5 (TASS)—"The Soviet Union is a single economic space, and this means that nuclear arms should be in the hands of the centre," head of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff Vladimir Lobov told TASS.

Lobov said the centre should also control nuclear arms, because the growing number of nuclear states would make the world less secure. "Transferring part of the Soviet Union's nuclear potential to Union republics is out of the question," Lobov said.

If the Ukraine or Kazakhstan secede from the Soviet Union, the country's leadership should determine the fate of nuclear weapons. "We have people in the country to resolve such issues. We, the military, are ready to give necessary consultations on the whole complex of issues connected with nuclear weapons," Lobov said.

Speaking about the current situation, Lobov said the general staff fully controls the Soviet Union's nuclear potential on the country's territory. He noted that places, where nuclear arms are being stored, are kept under constant control.

"I can state with full responsibility that we are securely guarding all our strategic nuclear forces, their location and combat duty sites," Lobov said.

RSFSR Foreign Minister on Control of Nuclear Forces

*PM0509084691 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Sep 91 p 7*

[Article by A. Kozyrev, foreign minister of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic: "Russia and the World. Join Us"]

[Text] During the days of the putsch, with the help of the Washington Center for Democracy headed by Professor Weinstein, an article of mine was published in THE WASHINGTON POST under the heading "Join Us." We asked for condemnation of the dictatorship and support for the resisting White House in Moscow, and that support was provided by democratic countries in the West. What people had been talking about for such a long time actually happened. Now we have seen who Russia's true friends and comrades abroad are.

Today, as Yelena Bonner rightly says, having won the battle, we must not lose the peace. That has happened once before in history, when after World War II the peoples of Russia were robbed of victory by communist totalitarianism, while the Western allies turned into enemies. Even the new political thinking did not remove the mark of suspicion from them. There was talk of overcoming confrontation and establishing cooperation, but nothing more.

Furthermore, the new democracies in Eastern Europe also came under suspicion over the last 12-18 months, although they sprang up largely thanks to Soviet perestroika. The Brezhnev doctrine gave way to a doctrine whereby the conclusion of treaties with Eastern neighbors who had gone too far in their renunciation of the socialist choice had to be accompanied by a solemn promise on their part not to enter into any alliances hostile to the Soviet Union. It ensued from this that despite declarations to the effect that NATO and the European Community are no longer regarded as adversaries, in practice they were still in the "untouchable" category. Otherwise what were these alliances that were banned to East Europeans?

What was a hostile environment for a state that had fused with the CPSU, should become a favorable environment for a democratic state. The strategic goal is rapprochement with the West with its foreign policy, economy, and other institutions. Greece, Spain, and Portugal have trodden this path. They helped them to emerge from dictatorship and they will help us too, if we finally make up our minds firmly and clearly.

Let us not forget, also, who it was who sympathized, covertly and overtly, with the putschists. It is high time that party ideology in choosing friends gave way to the categorical imperative—wish for others what you want for yourself. And that is freedom of choice, freedom of the press, free movement inside and outside the country. The time has come to stop military aid and reduce economic aid to all regimes in conflict regions, and also to Cuba and North Korea.

And of course there can be no delay in ensuring the openness of our own military spending at a level comparable with the objective information that is submitted by the U.S. Government to Congress and the American public.

Only well-informed public opinion, debates, and decisions by the body of deputies will help us to find a well-regulated level of reasonable sufficiency of expenditure on defense, although even now it is clear that that spending could be reduced significantly.

However the future of the Union takes shape, whatever path its constituent republics take, it is vitally important for accords to be secured between them on keeping the nuclear forces under unified control. This is a commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Ukrainian and Belorussian declarations of their unwillingness to be nuclear powers move in this direction. Outside the USSR, too, the nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and missile armaments is our priority.

The problem in general of security and cooperation between the former Union republics must be pondered in a most serious and, let us be blunt, revolutionary way. I think that the best way is not to reinvent the bicycle—as we have been trying to do for 70 years—but to follow existing models and international commitments.

The experience accumulated by NATO—with its single command and centralized control of the nuclear arsenal—may prove to be of interest in the resolution of military issues. But it is above all important for the USSR's CSCE commitments to be extended to the Union's republics. For this it is necessary, first, to find flexible ways to directly incorporate the republics in the all-European process so that they are directly conscious of their responsibility for the inviolability of borders, for observing human rights, and for economic cooperation. Second, it would be useful for an interrepublic conference, like the Helsinki conference, to be held to discuss significant common problems—once again on the firm civilized basis of the CSCE principles. And it is advisable to begin preparing this forum as soon as possible. If it

helps the conclusion of a Union treaty, well and good; if it proves to be the only form of multilateral political cooperation among the republics, all the more reason for not delaying. The value of the conference for those who will not be part of the new Union is also obvious.

The West can provide the most practical help in all this. Namely by its moral-political backing for the democratic processes and its perfection of the stages and mechanisms of cooperation both within the CSCE framework and with such stabilizing institutions as NATO, the EEC, and so on. Lastly, by immediate humanitarian food aid via the creation of a democracy support fund for this purpose. And, to go on, by its more substantial support for economic reforms—but not in isolation from them, as was previously the case, when credits vanished into the sand.

In short, when we appeal to the West we can say: "Join us in building a peaceful life, for Russians have proven their desire for democracy and civilization in the battle outside the White House."

START TALKS

RSFSR Defense Chief Ponders Deterrence, Parity
PM2908142491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 11-18 Aug 91 p 13

[By Colonel-General Konstantin Kobets, chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense: "Start the Beginning of a Cost-Efficient Defence"]

[Text] Until now the question of nuclear sufficiency was considered only in general, as some abstract ultimate goal. I am sure now it is time to move on to real figures, because our society can no longer afford to spend wastefully.

However, an open conversation on this subject today faces two basic obstacles:

Secrecy. This has always been one of the main barriers to achieving agreements at home and in the international arena. And it is symptomatic that the destruction of this barrier produced the most tangible results. START-1 is the most striking example, and to achieve this the sides had to fully reveal their nuclear potentials, including the quantity and types of nuclear weapons, deployment locations of nuclear carriers, on-spot inspection in the areas which quite recently were "the holy of holies". This required no miracle, since it has long been officially recognized on both sides that there can be no winner in a nuclear war. Hence, the role of a country's nuclear arsenal is not to defeat the enemy but to deter it from aggression. If so, then both sides must exchange not only information about their potentials but also come to an agreement on permissible levels of retaliation.

Perhaps this is exactly how experts at the USSR scientific institutions preparing recommendations for our

experts at the START talks think. It only remains to assume this since the public has no official information regarding this. Only the levels of potentials before and after the reductions are published. But it is still not known what will be the agreed-upon deterrent threshold and how much it costs. The paradox is that the potential enemy (better to say the partner at the talks) knows more than our own people do.

Method of estimating. This issue is directly linked with the issue of secrecy. It is not enough to give a concrete estimate: It is necessary to show how you arrived at it. One should not necessarily describe all this in newspapers although there is nothing terrible in this. This mostly concerns experts and official publications, but the main point is that each official publication, whether it is controlled by federal or republican bodies, should calculate costs in an open, agreed-upon way. Only then is it possible to determine an acceptable military budget and get approval for top-priority armaments programs.

Unfortunately, official estimates are not explained. This automatically raises doubts among some people; is there any method at all, and if yes, then is it a good method? This is not a futile question because ultimately we all pay.

This is a serious issue. The relative profitability of different arsenals might make it possible to reduce still more our military expenditures.

However, it is quite possible that the method now used is the best. If so, prove it.

In conclusion, my proposals. Let experts understand the method of estimating nuclear deterrence as well as the quantitative levels of these estimations after the presumed strategic arms reduction. What are the criteria for determining nuclear parity, what should the level of nuclear deterrence be after the reductions are carried out, and, finally, to what degree does it exceed the agreed-upon minimum level required for adequate deterrence?

Only after this is it possible to start working out a common stand on this problem and to rule out allocating funds blindly to nuclear armaments as was actually done previously.

Treaty Terms, START-2 Prospects Assessed

91WC0157A NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 31, Aug 91 pp 14-16

[Article by Andrey Kortunov: "Finally, START!: Historical Treaty Signed After 20 Years"]

[Text] The present treaty, often called START in accordance with the English abbreviation, is not just another agreement on arms control. It concludes 20 years of efforts by the USSR and United States in this area.

The strong as well as the weak aspects of the traditional model of negotiations were reflected in START. Its

shortcomings are apparent. But it would be unfair to ask diplomats and politicians for an ideal agreement in a period of transition, when the approaches of the time of the "cold war" no longer work and others are only beginning to show. In my view, it is much more useful to think about alternative versions of the negotiating process 10 to 15 years in advance, concentrating not so much on new possibilities as on the old and new threats to arms control. After all, the end of the "cold war" does not by itself guarantee rapid nuclear disarmament or even the strengthening of strategic stability.

Parity Is Dead, Long Live Parity!

Since the early 1970's, the starting point for any agreements has been the principle of parity reflected in the formula of "equality and equal security." The notions of a "fair or unfair" agreement were determined by the size and relative importance of the concessions of each of the sides. At the same time, parity was understood as an approximate qualitative equality in military capabilities. The negotiations themselves boiled down to the search for variants of the "exchange" of some strategic systems for others. Thus, each of the sides became the hostage of strategic decisions accepted by the partner. And since overall the United States had passed the USSR in the qualitative arms race, Washington was able to extract some advantages from the negotiations merely on the basis of the "export" of its strategic culture and the defining of the rules of the game in the nuclear area.

The preservation of some advantages in the scope of approximate parity was considered in the United States to be an extremely important compensation for the superiority of the USSR in conventional arms. Moscow never officially recognized an "imbalance" there or the right of the United States to maintain compensating advantages in the nuclear area. But the tacit accounting of the interrelationship between the nuclear and conventional balances remained an important element of the principle of parity.

Theoretically the traditional model of arms control could lead to complete symmetry of the strategic forces of the sides. Such symmetry, in turn, would permit the elaboration of an integral Soviet-American concept of strategic stability while allowing the Americans to retain some advantages through a higher technological level and peculiarities of their geostrategic position.

In the second half of the 1980's, however, both the USSR and the United States put into question the firmness of the principle of parity. The USSR put forward the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" and an "asymmetric response": the first was an attempt to find a new and "nonparity" basis for strategic planning and the second was a very definite signal to the American side that Moscow no longer intends to copy all of Washington's strategic decisions. The prospect of a strategic convergence of the USSR and the United States was put in doubt.

In the process of the START negotiations, the Americans, in turn, could not resist the temptation to make use of a period of maximum weakness of the USSR to obtain as much as they could while giving as little as possible.

Right away I will stipulate that I do not think that START weakens the security of the USSR. The "reserve of strength" accumulated in the nuclear area since the end of the 1940's is so great that the reductions foreseen by START will not be able to have any significant influence on the strategic balance. In addition, the Bush administration is in any case not in a position to make practical use of some advantages gained from the USSR during negotiations: Congress simply will not provide money for many programs.

Psychologically, however, the feeling of an "inequality of rights" under START may have serious consequences, especially since the concluding phase of the negotiations coincided with radical shifts in the balance of conventional arms on the continent of Europe. Today it is already difficult to justify even limited advantages of the United States in the nuclear sphere through references to Soviet superiority in conventional arms in Europe.

The Americans must take into account the fact that in losing its status as a superpower and encountering the "national egoism" of the United States in Geneva, the USSR may also lose interest in bilateral arms control. More preferable will be the version of "nuclear isolationism" implying complete independence from the United States in the strategic area ("asymmetric response") and the rejection of the American "strategic culture" (including the criteria of "unacceptable losses," the definition of "destabilizing systems," and so on).

Such a choice would have much in common with the strategic choice of Gaullist France in the 1960's: being unable to play with the two nuclear superpowers under their rules, Paris preferred not to recognize any rules at all. If Moscow takes this course in the 1990's, the existing infrastructure of bilateral Soviet-American negotiations is doomed to collapse quickly.

Will Achilles Overtake the Turtle?

For two decades, the USSR and United States have been accustomed to confirming the results of negotiations in the form of juridical treaties subject to ratification (although there were also exceptions taking the form of executive agreements). This gave the agreements reliability and established additional guarantees against possible violations.

With the passage of time, however, the necessity of detailed juridical regulation protracted the negotiations more and more and made the agreements cumbersome (START, for example, represents a 700-page volume). A great deal of time and effort goes for the specifying of definitions and rules for counting arms as well as for the development of procedures for their destruction and verification. The time for the preparation of agreements was prolonged, whereas the development of military

technology was accelerated, literally devaluating the newly signed documents before our eyes.

The START talks were perhaps the most graphic example of the inability of the traditional model of negotiations to keep up with the development of the political situation in the world and with progress in military technology. At the time of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington at the end of 1987, the sides thought it possible to sign START as early as the next year, 1988.

In the opinion of many experts, if a complex treaty (of the SALT-2 or START type) is not signed within five years after the beginning of the talks, it is hardly worthwhile to sign it at all: the initial assumptions of the negotiations become obsolete.

The necessity of considering the prospects of ratification also meant that the talks gradually began to be not bilateral but trilateral in nature: along with the governments of the USSR and United States, the American Congress also participated in them (I am not even talking about consultations of the two sides with their allies). This did even more to complicate the process. Now, with the involvement of the USSR Supreme Soviet in foreign and military policy, the talks are de-facto becoming quadrilateral. And you look and see that the republic supreme soviets are also showing an interest in discussing strategic problems.

Under these conditions, the question arises: Will Achilles overtake the turtle? Is the existing mechanism for negotiations capable of bearing such a load?

What the Professionals Cannot Do

Traditionally negotiations have been carried out at two levels: professionals (diplomats and military and technical experts) and politicians (summit meetings and talks between foreign ministers). In the first, they worked out mostly specific questions, whereas in the second the achieved fundamental agreements.

Such an approach worked successfully overall, although serious problems did arise from time to time. Under the conditions of the absence of fundamental agreements between politicians, the negotiations of professionals frequently were transformed into marking time: the members of the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva persisted in presenting their old positions to the other side. A unique "game of glass beads" continued for many months.

The desire of politicians to achieve an agreement at all costs for the next summit meeting usually led to a flurry of activity in Geneva.

Today, when the spectrum of Soviet-American interaction has widened, the political leaders of the two countries have many subjects for discussion that are unrelated to nuclear arms. In the absence of an immediate threat of nuclear confrontation, the significance of strategic problems will inevitably decline. The professional

technocrats think that the negotiation process must be "depoliticized" as much as possible and the pressure on delegations in Geneva from statesmen should be diminished. From their point of view, disarmament talks must become more routine in nature, remaining perhaps an important but by no means the determining component of Soviet-American relations. "Professionalization" will make it possible to make the negotiations more systematic and at the same time to avoid unjustified expectations and inevitable disappointments.

It is possible to understand the logic of professionals. But the "depoliticization" of negotiations also has negative aspects. Above all, they will be prolonged even more without constant political pressure: the professional approach essentially presupposes gradual progress. Professional negotiators prefer to untangle the Gordian knots of arms control rather than to cut through them.

Secondly, the professionalization of negotiations may in time degenerate into their bureaucratization. The lengthy process of negotiations inevitably transforms its participants into a kind of caste with its own group interests that sometimes differ substantially from the interests of the state.

Thirdly, professionals do not have the possibilities of the political leadership to stand up to the pressure of numerous forces within the country interested in preserving some strategic program or other. If the political leadership, after having turned arms control over to professionals, is not prepared to defend subsequent agreements, then the chances for successful counteraction will increase dramatically.

Still, I think that the time of comprehensive agreements on arms control has passed. Even START-2 should not be a treaty, strictly speaking, but a process, a series of specific agreements on relatively specific questions that in totality would supplement START-1.

Such an approach will not necessarily facilitate the negotiations. In the 1970's and 1980's, the USSR and United States sought to reach comprehensive agreements not just because of their political significance, although this consideration also played a role. The larger the total package of questions to be discussed, the more easily a compromise was achieved through the exchange of concessions in one area for concessions in another. Taking into account the existing asymmetries in the structures of Soviet and American strategic forces, without even mentioning the British, French, and Chinese nuclear potentials, it is very difficult to find mutually acceptable solutions to specific questions that do not affect others. This problem can be resolved by retaining the package principle, in that the packages merely become as large as is necessary to achieve a compromise.

Another danger of the sliding schedule of negotiations is that the delegations will try to concentrate on relatively easy problems in which there are no particular disagreements and will begin to postpone complex problems

(such a tendency was already seen in the START negotiations). As a result, we can expect not so much a limitation of the arms race as its rationalization—the blocking of those directions of it that are not promising from the point of view of both sides. It may be that this tendency can be neutralized only in the event that the negotiating sides are under continuous political pressure from the legislative bodies of the participating countries and from the public.

A Third Party Is Not Superfluous

The effectiveness of arms control will also depend to a considerable extent on the ability of the USSR and United States to involve third nuclear countries in it.

The difficulties on this path are not only political but also technical. For example, it will be necessary to replace the tried principles of negotiations (parity, equality of combat capabilities, comparability of reciprocal concessions) with much more complex criteria based on a multilateral nuclear equilibrium.

It is quite probable that in the distant future negotiations on the control of nuclear arms will begin to resemble the current talks on the distribution of the defense burden in the scope of NATO. In the foreseeable future, however, nuclear weapons will remain an important symbol of political status for economically relatively weak powers (USSR, France, Great Britain), which will doubtless complicate the negotiations. Moreover, the problems of the security of nuclear states will remain dissimilar, even if these countries achieve mutual understanding. For the USSR, let us say, it may be extremely important to implement some version of "expanded deterrence" to counteract the potential imbalances in the area of conventional arms on its southern or eastern borders.

The transition to multilateral forms of strategic arms control can be facilitated if its objectives are modified. The utopian nature of complete and universal nuclear disarmament has long been obvious for Soviet and American experts. But politicians of both countries declared their adherence to this idea, giving rise to unjustified expectations in the public and disorienting third nuclear powers. Multilateral arms control must be aimed not only at radical reductions or even severe limitations of existing arsenals but also at the coordination of modernization programs and the development of confidence-building measures in the strategic area. In this event, the involvement of third nuclear countries in the Soviet-American dialogue would proceed with a maximum of flexibility (as the first measure, one could expand the number of participants in the agreement on centers for the reduction of the risk of nuclear war and achieve a multilateral agreement on notification of launches of ballistic missiles). Every nuclear power would have the possibility of choosing the degree of its own participation in arms control based on its own analysis of the concomitant acquisitions and outlays.

And another thing. If international relations develop positively, then unilateral actions restricting the military

efforts of the leading powers will clearly outstrip even the modernization process of arms control. It is important to coordinate their unilateral steps.

The coordination of such steps without juridical ordering will not in any way impinge on the independence of the nuclear planning of third countries—so far not a single one of them is showing a willingness to participate in “classical” negotiations even as an observer—and at the same time will create the conditions for a more stable global nuclear balance.

U.S. Studying Nuclear-Powered Missiles

*PM2208155191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4*

[Untitled report from PRAVDA-TASS news roundup]

[Text] The U.S. Department of Defense is carrying out a top secret study of the possibility of developing a new generation of missiles with nuclear propulsion units. THE NEW YORK TIMES reports today that back in July experts from the Pentagon's Offensive and Space Systems Agency prepared a report on their research in that field. The document is now being sent out to federal departments and U.S. military-industrial complex corporations for their comments. The project's existence was first reported by the Federation of American Scientists—a public organization that is opposed to the placing of nuclear reactors in space. Its data were later confirmed by official government documents. According to the project's authors, the new missiles will replace existing missiles using chemical fuel. The advocates of this rearmament point out that the use of nuclear propulsion units promises a whole range of advantages—for example, increased missile velocity, and, accordingly, less time to detect and destroy it. It also offers an opportunity to increase missile size and weight.

Development of New Class of ICBM Completed

*LD2708103291 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT
27 Aug 91*

[Text] Moscow, August 27 (TASS)—“Recently, work has been completed on the Kuryer programme, within the framework of which specialists in the Institute have elaborated a new class of Soviet ballistic missiles”, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes today, quoting an unnamed source in the Automatics and Instrument Engineering Scientific and Research Institute.

“According to the source, who works on control systems for ballistic missiles and ensures test launches and flights, the new missile is similar to the U.S. Minuteman missile, and its flight range is 10,000 kilometers,” the newspaper writes.

“The first test launch was to be from the Plesetsk launch site between May-June,” the newspaper writes. “But the test was canceled, and later launches were postponed several times.”

“Finally, several employees of the institute learnt that between August 19-20, Institute Director Vladimir Lapygin (an MP and former chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Commission for Defence Issues and State Security) was ordered to launch the missile this week,” the newspaper writes.

“Asked who signs such instructions, he said: ‘the country's president or defence minister,’” the newspaper writes.

Air Force Colonel: No Strategic Bombers Near Tartu

*OW3108170191 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1530 GMT 31 Aug 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In an interview with the Tartu newspaper POSTIMEES Colonel Valeriy Yanin, commander of a strategic long-range bombers division stationed near the Estonian city of Tartu, denied the assertion of academic Mikhail Bronstein, a deputy representing Estonia, who had spoken before the USSR Supreme Soviet's session Wednesday, that strategic bombers and nuclear weapons are stationed at an airfield in the suburbs of Tartu. Colonel Yanin pointed out that there are no nuclear arms in or around Tartu. Colonel Yanin argues that since the end of the “cold war”, not a single bomber carrying nuclear weapons has taken off in the USSR.

Opinion Poll Taken on START Treaty Signing

*OW0209063091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0613 GMT 2 Sep 91*

[From “Viewpoint”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the “Data” news agency, on August 9-19 the National Public Opinion Studies Center took an opinion poll among 2,021 respondents all over the Soviet Union asking them: “Was the signing of the START Treaty in Moscow a success or a failure of the Soviet foreign policy?”

43 percent said it had been a success.

1 out of 10 had an opposite opinion.

47 percent did not answer.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

SCC Concludes Regular Session 28 Aug in Geneva

*LD2808194191 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT
28 Aug 91*

[By Sergey Sedov]

[Text] Geneva, August 28 (TASS)—The Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission [SCC], established

under the memorandum of understanding between the governments of the USSR and the United States of December 21, 1972, ended its regular session here today.

During the session, the sides continued to exchange views on aspects of realizing provisions and reaching the objectives of the agreements signed by the two countries on the reduction of strategic arms and measures to lessen the danger of a nuclear war breaking out.

Soviet and American negotiators agreed to hold the next session of the commission in Geneva on January 28, 1992.

Army Paper Welcomes Warning Against ABM Plan

*PM0409110391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Aug 91 First Edition p 2*

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA military observer Colonel M. Ponomarev commentary: "Arguments Worthy of Attention"]

[Text] Materials have already been published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reporting the U.S. Senate decision concerning the deployment of a ground-based ABM defense system with the aim of defending the continental United States against a limited or unsanctioned ICBM strike. These materials have not only set out concrete facts but also contained assessments of them. However, this topic is so important that we will clearly have to address it more than once in the future.

In this connection I would draw readers' attention to an article in the influential American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES, which in my view is of definite interest. It is, of course, not possible to agree unreservedly with its every word. Moreover, it was printed before the recent events in the Soviet Union, therefore several of its formulations now sound anachronistic. But as a whole I think that the article reflects a correct viewpoint on the Senate decision and that the arguments in it deserve the most serious attention.

In fact, implementing the U.S. Senate decision would not strengthen but seriously weaken U.S. security, and it would not rid mankind of the danger of nuclear war but would preserve it. Indeed, neither Washington nor Moscow will be able to remain indifferent observers if the other side begins to deploy ABM defense systems over and above those allowed by the 1972 treaty. Such a deployment could actually initiate a revival of the arms race, and what is more in its most dangerous area—that of nuclear missiles. And finally, implementation of the plans approved by the senators will essentially put paid to the newly-signed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which has still not even been submitted for ratification either in the USSR or the United States, because the Soviet Union made the special proviso that it would only be binding as long as the ABM Treaty is observed.

The NEW YORK TIMES article is unsigned. This means that it expresses not someone's personal viewpoint but a certain system of views. It was published after the Senate decision, but before the decision has been coordinated with the House of Representatives and approved by the U.S. Congress as a whole. This is why such importance attaches to its appeal to show wisdom and to reject, before it is too late, the very idea of deploying an ABM defense system in haste and so undermining the ABM Treaty.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S. Charges of Treaty Violations Rejected

*91WC0158A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 21, May 91 p 11*

[Article by Lt. Col. P. Vladimirov: "Claims: The Opinion of a Military Expert"]

[Text] The latest report of the U.S. administration revealing cases of the "nonperformance by the Soviet Union of agreements in the arms control area" has come out. It contains claims of the American leadership against the Soviet side in practically the entire spectrum of treaty obligations that affect the interest of these two sides in the area of the limitation of arms. But is this really so? Is there really a basis for the claims? Let us look at them using the example of the performance of the INF Treaty by the USSR and United States.

One of the claims made to the Soviet side by the Americans on this question is the "refusal of the Soviet Union to allow the United States to utilize the 'Cargoscan' apparatus to scan three containers with Soviet missiles in Votkinsk" during the period from the 1st through the 10th of March 1990. What actually happened was the following.

In accordance with the stipulations of the INF Treaty and the Protocol on Inspections, the Americans set up X-ray equipment in a passage in a plant in Votkinsk to obtain images using the nondamaging "Cargoscan" method for the purpose of the transillumination of the second stage of the SS-25 missile. The technical parameters of the indicated equipment and the procedures for its operation were agreed on by the sides in advance. But the experiments carried out by Soviet and American representatives showed that individual technical parameters of the equipment (size of the exposure zone in depth and in the vertical) and the operating procedures (system for dealing with the taped image after the conclusion of the inspection procedures) do not correspond to the agreements.

In this connection, the Americans were told that until the indicated discrepancies are eliminated the SS-25 missiles leaving the plant in Votkinsk will be presented for inspection in accordance with the previously established procedures, by-passing "Cargoscan."

On 1 March, however, the Americans demanded that a car leaving the plant with an SS-25 in a launch container be X-rayed using "Cargoscan" equipment and this was not refused. At the same time, the Americans proposed that there be a meeting of experts of the USSR and United States to resolve technical questions having to do with the equipment and that the missiles not be taken out of the plant until these questions are settled. The Soviet side agreed to such a meeting but demanded that there be no interference with the removal of the missiles. A total of three containers with missiles were taken out of the plant during this period.

As a result of the discussions between the Soviet and American experts that took place in Votkinsk in March 1990, the sides were able to work out mutually acceptable technical solutions that relieved our concerns about the "Cargoscan" equipment and made it possible for the Americans to begin to operate it. After this, this question was covered in the relations of the sides.

The United States is also claiming that in the course of 1990 the Americans "found out about several launch sites for SS-4 missiles and means for their transport located at bases not declared by the USSR in accordance with the INF Treaty." The report examines the question of whether the existence of these undeclared facilities is a violation of the INF Treaty. In reality, the following took place.

In April 1990, the Americans raised the question of equipment for R-12 missiles (the designation used in the USSR) detected with U.S. national technical means of verification at a facility in the region of Kotovsk. Specifically, they observed two launch stands and four transport vehicles for these missiles that fall under the INF Treaty. At the same time, the attention of the Soviet side was directed to the fact that the facility in the region of Kotovsk was not declared by the USSR in the INF Treaty. The United States is demanding that the indicated equipment be destroyed in accordance with the treaty.

In this connection, the Americans were told that the object observed by the American side represent remnants of two former launch stands and four transport vehicles for R-12 missiles. On these launch stands, the upper frame with jacks and support slabs is missing or has been cut and the attached equipment has been removed. As for the transport vehicles, the wheels have been removed and the electrical equipment has been dismantled. The two former launch stands and four transport vehicles for the R-12 missiles in the region of Kotovsk are scrap metal, have been in this state since 1983, and could have been observed by U.S. national technical means of verification since that time. The American side was also given photographs of the remains of the equipment for the R-12 missiles near Kotovsk.

And, finally, one last thing. The most serious concern of the Americans in connection with the fulfillment of the

INF Treaty "is the presence of SS-23 missiles and their launchers in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany."

Yes, indeed, in accordance with intergovernmental agreements with Bulgaria, the former GDR, and Czechoslovakia that were concluded prior to the signing of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union delivered 16 launchers for OTR-23 (SS-23) missiles to these countries in 1985-1987 (eight to Bulgaria, four to the GDR, and four to Czechoslovakia). Along with the missiles themselves, it also delivered cassette front ends [kassetynye golovnyye chasty] with a conventional explosive charge and auxiliary equipment.

In March 1990, the Americans declared that their national technical means had detected equipment in the territory of the GDR having to do with the SS-23 missile system and asked Soviet officials for appropriate explanations.

They were told in response that the USSR had completely fulfilled its obligations with respect to the OTR-23 (SS-23) missiles. The OTR-23 missile systems located in the GDR are the property of the GDR and were delivered to it before the signing of the INF Treaty. Under the treaty, the Soviet Union does not have any obligations with respect to OTR-23 missile systems belonging to the GDR. And since the systems in question, which are not armed with nuclear warheads, are the property of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, the Soviet side did not consider it necessary to inform the American side of these systems earlier.

In May 1990, the United States again raised the question of the receipt of information from the USSR on the quantity and fate of all the missiles of the type falling under the restrictions of the INF Treaty that are located in Eastern Europe and not indicated in the Memorandum on Agreement for the INF Treaty and also on any agreements between the USSR and these countries with respect to the servicing of these missile systems, training in their operation, and their command and control. In connection with press reports on an agreement between the USSR and the GDR providing for the return of SS-23 missiles located in the GDR for their elimination, the American side also asked for information about the plans of the USSR for the elimination of these missiles and related equipment. The United States believed that the SS-23 missile systems located in Eastern Europe must be destroyed in accordance with the procedures set forth by the INF Treaty so as to eliminate the threat that these missiles create for European security.

In this connection, the American side was given the following explanation. The USSR eliminated all of its OTR-23 missile systems in accordance with the INF Treaty. Long before the signing of this treaty, the Soviet Union delivered OTR-23 missile systems to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria without nuclear warheads. The indicated systems, including nonnuclear warheads for them, are the property of these countries and do not

fall under the provisions of the treaty. Information about these systems is within the competence of the mentioned countries and the question raised by the United States about the elimination of the OTR-23's belonging to these countries is also within their competence.

In a note of the GDR Foreign Ministry in June 1990, it was pointed out that SS-23 launchers were independently destroyed by the German Democratic Republic and that the warheads are also presently being destroyed by their own forces. In the note, the GDR asked that the missile engines be destroyed in the territory of the USSR. Since the realization of such a request affects the obligations of the sides under the INF Treaty, the GDR indicated that it was informing the United States of the content of that request.

This is the real situation in connection with the American claims with respect to the performance of the INF Treaty by the Soviet side. These are the facts but the U.S. administration is interpreting them only in a light that is favorable to the Americans. That is, in a prejudiced manner or at least on the edge of prejudice.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Cooperation with Germans in Disposal of Military Equipment

91SV0038B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 9 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Major-General, Candidate of Technical Sciences B. Surikov: "The Armor Is Strong but the Tanks Have Become Superfluous...."]

[Text] We all know that the Germans know how to work. But then a seven-man team could not disassemble a single combat vehicle during an entire week. By the way, we could do this together with quite a bit of success.

What does the withdrawal of our troops from Germany signify? It requires nearly 11,000 rail consists. Warsaw has requested a transit fee of \$16,000 for each consist and \$280 for each vehicle and we need to form nearly 3,000 truck convoys consisting of 250-350 military vehicles each. The Polish side also categorically objects to the movement across its territory of any ammunition that is in Western Group of Forces arsenals. Warsaw would also like to receive an additional one million dollars from the Soviet Union to repair its railroad network.

Let us recall that during the past 45 years the Northern Group of Forces has built homes, barracks, vehicle storage areas, and other structures—altogether a total of nearly three billion rubles. The Polish side is striving to receive all of this free of charge or to pay a token price. Warsaw is also demanding hard currency for the land on which our military facilities are located. In so doing, the Poles want lease payments beginning from 1945.

It is appropriate to recall that the Soviet Union provided modern weapons and military equipment under

extremely favorable terms to our former allies during the 35 years that the Warsaw Treaty existed. Today their cost in freely-convertible hard currency totals many tens of billions of dollars. So, in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], the assessment of the weapons that we provided to the army of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] exceeds 80 billion marks.

Now, our former allies, while reducing their own armed forces, are attempting to sell Soviet-made weapons to the developing countries, to convert them for use for civilian purposes, or to destroy them. For example, a decision has been made in the FRG to keep only 24 MIG-29 interceptors in the inventory. The remaining Soviet-made systems will be subject to being turned into secondary raw material.

This comprehensive problem is quite complicated, however, the shift of former Warsaw Treaty participants to market relations is opening broad possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation. While organizing direct ties between the USSR and the East European countries, our country could assist them to convert tanks and armored vehicles with their weapons removed into all-purpose prime movers, bulldozers, and all-terrain fire-fighting vehicles.

Soviet experts have developed safe methods and technologies to disarm weapons and military vehicles. So, scientists from the collective of the Military Engineering Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy have substantiated and experimentally verified disarmament technology of especially durable structures using special explosives. Using pin-point blasting, they can destroy tank armor in such a way that it can be used in the national economy. The expenses for experimental work that was conducted in the FRG to destroy one Soviet-made tank using torch cutting significantly exceeded the cost of the expensive armor obtained after destroying the tank.

We estimate that there is 1,700,000 tons of ammunition (shells, bombs, mines, ground-based and aircraft tactical missiles) and also other material-technical resources that have been accumulated in the Western Group of Forces. Germany receives 50,000 marks from us for each maritime transportation load of military equipment and ammunition to Mukran or Rostok. It is easy to imagine how much hard currency and rubles are required to use special transportation to transport all of our ammunition to the USSR.

Preliminary analysis indicates it is economically profitable to not return the majority of the ammunition to the USSR but to insure its safe disassembly and conversion into secondary raw material in the Western Group of Forces released funds.

Acquisition of valuable secondary raw material from ammunition is a quite complicated engineering problem. The main difficulty is compliance with strict safety requirements which automated enterprises for disassembling ammunition must satisfy. These facilities can begin

operating in the troops only if they comply with the FRG's ecological requirements.

Besides ferrous and nonferrous metals, a great quantity of explosives will be obtained during explosives disassembly. On this basis, our defense industry can produce multipurpose water-resistant plastic charges for welding, forming, hardening items, and also for explosive cutting of steelwork, concrete and rock.

A ton of high-quality nonferrous or ferrous metals on Western markets costs in dollars: nickel—\$7,900, tin—\$6,300, copper—\$3,300, zinc—\$1,750, lead—\$980 and, light steel—\$2,800. The secondary raw material obtained from the utilization of our ammunition will be cheaper than metal manufactured at specialized plants.

The savings from not transporting ammunition from Germany to the USSR and sales of a large quantity of secondary raw material, civilian items, and other military equipment to Western manufacturers may yield income of nearly \$1 billion.

We can carry out the proposed large-scale program for the utilization of ammunition and other military equipment only in the event that a Soviet-German Joint Scientific Production Association is created, for example, under the arbitrary designation "Razoruzheniye" [Disarmament].

The total cost of engineering structures built by us in the Western Group of Forces exceeds eight billion marks. A portion of these funds can be used in the event Razoruzheniye Joint Scientific Production Association is founded. The Soviet side can invest in founding capital the engineering facilities, defense industry technological equipment for the disassembly and utilization of ammunition and also the know-how to reprocess explosives into civilian goods.

Konvern Inter-Branch Commercial Production Center (MPKTs) has been created by government order to prepare the released military equipment for use in the national economy.

It is advisable to have an interim creative collective of defense industry experts, military experts and USSR Academy of Sciences scientists and also German experts under Konvern MPKTs. The German firm Kommerts Konsult from Frankfurt-am-Main may organize the involvement of German scientists and military experts in this work with whose help the USSR has already created a Soviet-German joint venture to produce civilian goods.

Hard currency income received as a result of the utilization and sale of military equipment in the FRG will augment a special USSR Armed Forces social protection fund. Their sales through a system of auctions may provide an additional several billion rubles to the servicemen's social protection fund and also to conduct USSR Armed Forces military reform.

UK Team Carries Out CSBM Inspection in Carpathian MD

TV Report

LD2108054591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Aug 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] On 14 August, in accordance with the clauses of the Vienna document of 1990 on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe, the Government of Great Britain submitted a request to the Soviet Union on making an assessment of information on the military forces and deployment plans of the main systems of armaments and equipment in the 310th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Carpathian Military District [MD]. The request of Great Britain to make an assessment was satisfied. Today representatives of Great Britain arrived on the territory of the Carpathian MD and made an assessment of the information made available to them.

TASS Report

PM2908114291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Request Met"]

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, the British Government asked the Soviet Union 14 August 1991 for permission to assess information about military forces and plans for the deployment of basic arms systems and equipment in the Carpathian Military District's 310th Motorized Rifle Regiment.

Britain's request for an assessment was met. British representatives arrived in the Carpathian Military District 20 August and assessed the information provided.

U.S. To Withdraw Two Divisions From Europe

PM2208135591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

["Own Information"—TASS report under general heading "Foreign Military Chronicle": "They Are Leaving Europe..."]

[Text] Next year the United States will begin to withdraw two of its four combat divisions stationed in Europe, U.S. Army official spokesman P. Keating reported. The withdrawal of the 8th Infantry Division and the 3rd Armored Division, which are deployed in Germany, is part of the U.S. Army's program of reducing U.S. Armed Forces abroad.

It is planned that the transfer of servicemen and combat equipment from Europe will be completed by 1995. This will mean a cut of 71,000 U.S. servicemen on the continent.

As a result of the withdrawal of these divisions, the United States will disband one of its two corps in the European theater of military operations. The V Corps, which will remain on the continent with headquarters at Frankfurt am Main, will include the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Infantry Division, which will become the principal strike force in the event of war.

The withdrawal of the two army divisions from Europe will be implemented within the framework of the plan, recently announced by the Pentagon, to cut U.S. Armed Forces by about 20 percent over the next four years. This plan also makes provision for an improvement in their structures in order to perform rapid deployment tasks in various regions of the world where conflicts might arise, like the crisis in the Persian Gulf region.

Assurances Offered on Continued Withdrawal From Germany

WGF Commander: No Change in Schedule

PM2308115591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 91 Single Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces, by correspondent Colonel B. Markushin; date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction: "Meeting in Wuensdorf"]

[Text] Manfred Stolpe, premier of Brandenburg state, met with Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], and Colonel General B. Grebenyuk, chief of the WGF Military-Political Directorate. After the conversation took place, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent posed several questions to Colonel General Burlakov.

[Markushin] Comrade Commander in Chief, what was the purpose of your meeting with the premier of Brandenburg state?

[Burlakov] It was an ordinary meeting which the premier and I agreed on earlier. But the fact that it took place right today, of course, had an effect on the conversation's contents. The complex situation in the Soviet Union cannot help but worry both us and our German partners. Therefore, we informed M. Stolpe and his entourage in a completely frank manner that the group of forces is engaging in combat training and effecting measures to systematically withdraw units to the Soviet Union at the same pace as before.

[Markushin] In the present situation, can any adjustments be made to the schedule for withdrawing the troops from Germany?

[Burlakov] For the moment there is no question of any adjustments being made. At the same time, I would like to emphasize once more that the pace of the redeployment remains linked to progress in the building of housing for the families of servicemen returning to the USSR.

[Markushin] The Western Group of Forces is physically separated from the homeland but is inseparable from it spiritually. What in your opinion is most important to the group's servicemen now?

[Burlakov] For all of us, ensuring a high level of combat readiness remains a task of primary importance. But this is unthinkable without the ordinary soldiers' and officers' moral cohesiveness. Today any indulgence at all in discipline and orderliness, and any ill-considered evaluations of what is taking place are inadmissible. We support the people from a moral point of view, and their striving to live in safety and harmony.

Defense Minister: Withdrawal To Accelerate

LD2708184891 Hamburg DPA in German 1813 GMT 27 Aug 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany will be accelerated. USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov announced this in an interview for ARD's [First German Television] "Panorama" program, to be broadcast this evening. Around 270,000 Soviet soldiers are stationed in eastern Germany. Because of the problems in accommodating them in their homeland, talk over the past few months extended the withdrawal delay.

Withdrawal To Continue on Schedule

PM0209144191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Ye. Bovkun report: "Withdrawal of Soviet Troops From Germany Continues on Schedule"]

[Text] Bonn—I do not know what feelings were experienced by General Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, when he received the plotters' directives from Moscow, but the decision he made proved his perception of the significance of the moment: A sort of panic had developed among the FRG population, especially in the eastern states. The prospect of 272,000 soldiers armed with contemporary hardware coming under the control of a Stalinist "emergency committee" could mean serious danger. Trade union aktiv members in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state even decided upon a desperate measure—admittedly, without first reaching agreement with the leadership of the German Trade Union Federation. Having arrived at the Soviet base in Schwerin, they appealed to the commander in chief to open the barracks gates and give soldiers and their families a chance to gain political asylum in Germany.

General Burlakov told the FRG representatives exactly what was expected of him: Troop withdrawals would continue in strict accordance with the treaty schedule.

But a complex, even strange situation emerged. The self-proclaimed USSR president's decree only extended, after all, to "certain regions" of our country. So why at that time did the putschists send it to the Western Group of Forces?

The instructions—which at first glance are idiotic—on how to behave abroad during the "state of emergency" (as we know, they were also received by embassies and trade missions) pursued, nonetheless, a simple but quite crafty aim: Indeed, there will always be people who set about ardently fulfilling even vague directions—"to show constraint"—and thus immediately become accomplices in the coup, or at the very least do not condemn it.

If something happens in the Western Group of Forces to give the FRG and its allies cause to suspect a chance of destabilizing the atmosphere in regions where forces are stationed, NATO headquarters could make decisions or take steps to forestall this. And this is all it would have taken for the junta to cry "our men are under attack!" and to demand the introduction of martial law on the entire territory of the country. It is terrible to think how all of this could have ended. Compliance with the schedule to withdraw Soviet troops from the FRG calmed local opinion and defused the atmosphere.

Not everything is rosy in relations between our army in Germany and the local authorities. Leaders of Saxony, referring to information from the Federal Department for Defending the Constitution, complain in particular that Soviet intelligence services are conducting a massive bugging operation on telephone conversations, having set up special equipment in a number of barracks which can pick up signals from required telephone calls and record the conversations. For this, the most important subscribers are put on a large computer.

Of course, all this is bound to overshadow bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the main thing now is to comply with international legal norms. Therefore, the withdrawal of soldiers and equipment from Germany continues. Already, 85,000 men have left the FRG (by the end of the year this figure will read 150,000), along with 343,000 tonnes of arms (by the end of the year this will total 444,000).

The troops are leaving. Where will they go? Are there not too many of them to return to Russia alone, if the other republics refuse to accept the soldiers on their territory once they become fully independent?

Call for Faster Pullout Viewed

*PM0309130591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Aug 91 First Edition p 3*

[Colonel V. Markushin report: "Not To Exacerbate the Problem"]

[Text] The issue of speeding up the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces has again been raised in

German government circles. Following in the footsteps of the Bundestag experts on defense questions who made special statements on this subject, Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher has expressed his opinion. He linked the need for a faster withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany with the urgent radical reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, whose might, according to him, is not comparable with the present level of the country's economic development.

In principle there is nothing unnatural in the fact that the German side is hoping for an early—that is, before December 1994—liberation of the territory of the former GDR from Soviet garrisons. Many problems have been connected with our presence, as with the foreign military presence in Germany as a whole. The Germans would like to resolve them as soon as possible. And the Soviet Union understands this very well. Which, in particular, was confirmed in the new USSR defense minister's interview given to USSR and FRG television correspondents.

However, analyzing the reasons for the present upsurge in demands for the speediest withdrawal of Soviet troops, you come to the conclusion that they are dictated by recent events in our country. In all probability, Bonn believes that the attempted coup d'état has weakened the Soviet leadership's position and will force it to be more compliant.

In this connection I would like to stress that all these calculations cannot solve the main problem of the forces that are being withdrawn. This problem is common knowledge—the provision of facilities for them in new places. So if Bonn is today expressing the hope that the Treaty on the Temporary Presence and Regulated Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from FRG Territory will be implemented ahead of schedule, it must show that it is prepared to assist in the practical resolution of this problem.

Furthermore, there is every reason to fear that any faster "signal to assemble for travel" to the Soviet troops may evoke excessive activeness among a section of the population to "send packing the guests who have overstayed their welcome." In that event would we not have a substantial increase in the unlawful actions against Soviet citizens in the Western Group of Forces which are already occurring today?

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from FRG territory is a very complex problem for both countries. And we must do everything we can to ensure that it in no way has a negative effect on the existing good-neighborly relations between us.

WGF Commander Urges Transit Talks With Poland, CSFR

*LD3008091891 Hamburg DPA in German 0810 GMT
30 Aug 91*

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—Negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia on the return of Soviet troops from

Germany through these two countries should be resumed. The commander in chief of the Soviet Western Group of Forces [WGF] stationed in Germany, Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, had proposed this to USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, it was said in a statement released late last night from the Western Group's press center in Wuensdorf.

In the statement, Burlakov once again gave the assurance that nothing would change in the timetable for the withdrawal of troops from the Federal Republic. It will be "strictly adhered to." At the same time Burlakov expressed his thanks "to the German citizens, various establishments, and the Bundeswehr" for the support shown during the withdrawal of the troops.

Agreed Schedule Remains in Force

*LD3108172891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1036 GMT 31 Aug 91*

[By TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy]

[Text] Berlin, 31 August (TASS)—When will the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Germany to be finished: in 1994, as was established by the appropriate agreement between USSR and the FRG, or two years earlier? Such questions were raised today in various newspapers in eastern Germany. In theory, the completion of the withdrawal in 1992 is possible—writes, for example, BERLINER MORGENPOST citing the parliamentary state secretary in the Ministry of Defense Willi Wimmer. The newspaper notes that from the beginning of this year 80,000 soldiers and 25,000 members of the servicemen families have already left Germany, that is, in accordance with the schedule. And withdrawal of the equipment has even gone ahead of the schedule.

At the press center of the Western Group of Forces (WGF), where the TASS correspondent went to request a comment on these suggestions, he was told the following.

Information that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany is being carried out significantly ahead of the agreed schedule and could be completed by the end of next year or the beginning of 1993 was broadcast by USSR Central Television. However, this does not correspond to the reality. Chief Commander of the Western Group of Forces Colonel General Matvey Burlakov confirms that the plan and the schedule agreed with the German side remain in force. The troops' withdrawal is being carried out with consideration to the real technical and transportation capacities, the preparation of a social base for the personnel as well as construction of housing for 55,000 servicemen families who do not have accommodation. As is registered in the agreement, the last Soviet soldier will leave German land by the end of 1994.

Defense Minister, FRG Ambassador Meet

*LD3108082191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1242 GMT 31 Aug 91*

[Text] Moscow, 31 August (TASS)—Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister, today

received Klaus Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request. A frank conversation took place, during which problems of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from German territory were discussed, as well as other questions of mutual interest. Noting that there had never been any Soviet chemical weapons on the territory of Germany, the Soviet military leader stated unequivocally: At the present time, not a single unit of Soviet nuclear ammunition remains on German soil.

The meeting passed off in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Soviet Team Carries Out CSBM Inspection in Oldenburg, FRG

*PM2908112491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Aug 91 First Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Request Met"]

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe, the USSR requested the FRG's permission to carry out an evaluation of information on the military forces and plans for the deployment of basic weapons systems and hardware in the FRG's 31st Motorized Infantry Brigade of the 11th Motorized Infantry Division of the 1st Army Corps stationed in the city of Oldenburg.

The USSR's request to carry out an evaluation was granted.

The Soviet representatives carried out the evaluation of information 21 August.

Polish Representative Cited on Troop Withdrawal Talks

Sees 'Hope of Success'

*PM2308123391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Aug 91 Single Edition p 3*

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Volkov: "Latest Round of Talks"]

[Text] Warsaw, 21 August—The latest, 11th, round of Soviet-Polish talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Poland's territory and associated questions began here today. In an interview with a PAP correspondent, Jerzy Sulka, leader of the Polish delegation and director of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs department, described these talks as difficult but offering hope of success.

Agreement Said Likely

*PM2908102491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Aug 91 Single Edition p 5*

[By Lieutenant Colonel V. Petrukhin: "Real Prospects Open Up"]

[Text] In a television interview J. Sulek, head of the Polish delegation at the Soviet-Polish intergovernmental talks on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland and the transit of units from the Western Group of Forces through its territory, stressed that progress was made at the eleventh round of talks that have just ended. The sides virtually reached agreement on the dates for the withdrawal. Now the dates must be approved by both states' leadership. There are real prospects, Sulek said, of a definitive agreement on all accords during the next round of talks to be held in Moscow at the end of September.

In this connection Poland's mass media note that the Soviet Union, despite any circumstances, is committed to its previous course of fully withdrawing its troops from abroad.

Grinevskiy Calls for More Work at CSBM Talks

*LD0409213291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1240 GMT 4 Sep 91*

[By Vladimir Smelov, Tass correspondent]

[Text] Vienna, 4 September—A plenary meeting at the confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] talks in Europe, which took place in the Austrian capital today, underlines the need to undertake energetic efforts so that they give fresh dynamism and produce results. This is even more important, it was stressed in the speeches, because the positive moves at the present stage of the talks in which the 35 states of the CSCE are participating, are so far quite small, and it is necessary to reach a solution that satisfies all sides on the outstanding problems without delay.

There are many such problems. Many very important military structures of the armed forces as well as their activities still remain outside the sphere of openness. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly drawn attention to this, and it has put forward the relevant proposals which are on the table at the talks. The problem of limiting military activities, which is acquiring a special significance in the military and political landscape which is being formed in Europe, is still waiting to be solved. A number of unresolved issues in connection with the communications network of the CSCE have not yet been settled.

In a word, there are enough troubles that need solutions, and the participants in the talks will have to roll up their sleeves and set to work in order not to arrive empty handed at a new European meeting of the "Helsinki-2". March 1992 is not far away. Bearing in mind the upcoming seminar on military doctrines, which is to take

place in Vienna in October, and that the talks at the forum of the 35 nations will be suspended for the period of this seminar, the delegations have not got much time for work.

Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, who spoke at the meeting, told the partners about the most important changes which have been taking place in the USSR since the events of 19-21 August. Having revealed the information about the agreed statement which was issued at the beginning of the congress of USSR People's Deputies by the country's president and the highest leaders of 10 Union republics, the Soviet diplomat especially underscored the fact that this document confirms that the USSR is behaving strictly in accordance with all the international agreements and obligations that the USSR has taken upon itself. This includes the questions of reducing weapons, control over weapons, and foreign economic obligations.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

'Immediate' Tactical Nuclear Talks Proposed

*LD0309000291 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT
2 Sep 91*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, September 2 (TASS)—Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Sam Nunn, now visiting Moscow, said in an interview with the CBS Television Network Washington and Moscow should consider the question of tactical nuclear weapons of each side.

He said land-based tactical nuclear weapons are probably a menace to both sides rather than a factor of stability.

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke in the same vein in an interview to a CDF television programme. He admitted that urgent elimination of short-range nuclear missiles and atomic artillery ammunition is an urgent task. Genscher said these missiles are no longer of the same importance as they used to be, and the time has come to rid the world of them.

One should agree with these proposals. There are perhaps somewhat different reasons for the immediate opening of the talks on tactical nuclear weapons. It is believed in the West the main reason behind this concern is that Moscow may lose control over the Soviet nuclear arsenal and that during the disintegration of the USSR, its nuclear armaments may be taken over by individual republics. Such fears should be taken into consideration. It would not be bad if such fears prompted the beginning of talks.

However, there are considerations which dictate the need for the immediate opening of talks on the elimination of land-based tactical weapons. Such weapons are obviously unnecessary and useless in the present military-strategic situation which has undergone radical changes.

NATO armed forces and those of the USSR do not oppose each other directly. East-West relations are no longer confrontational. Moreover, they are switching to cooperation, and the likelihood of surprise attack from both sides is zero. Nothing has been left of the Western assertions that short-range nuclear weapons are being deployed to arrest the Soviet Union's breakthrough into Western Europe.

Disproportions in conventional armaments that may have a destabilising effect will be eliminated under the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The permissible levels of such armaments will be considerably decreased.

The Soviet Union will soon have withdrawn its troops and armaments, including nuclear weapons, from eastern Europe.

The United States, for its part, dropped a number of provisions of "flexible reaction" concept which envisaged the use of short-range nuclear missiles. It also announced plans to give up the planned modernisation of its tactical missile Lance and nuclear artillery.

Thus it would be right to say there exists a solid base for a serious and constructive discussion on matters of the removal of nuclear confrontation as regards tactical missiles.

It should also be noted that some in the United States said recently that following the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms disarmament process exhausted itself and the sides are not inclined to resume negotiations soon. But experience upsets such likely calculations. It is necessary to ensure the continuity of disarmament since this is the only way towards strategic stability in the world.

NUCLEAR TESTING

New Situation Said To Call for End to Testing

PM1908092591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[M. Ponomarev "Observer's Column" article: "Time To Stop Now"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union has consistently advocated a complete stop to all nuclear tests. [passage omitted]

Recently Swedish representative Mai-Britt Theorin addressed the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. She stated that, with the end of the cold war, the time had finally come, in her government's opinion, to conclude a

treaty completely banning all nuclear weapons tests. Such a ban would, in her words, become "the key to nuclear disarmament."

Sweden's initiative is not the only new move toward the solution of this problem that worries all mankind. Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, recently reported China's decision to subscribe to the International Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This decision created a positive response throughout the world. Virtually all the nuclear powers are now becoming party to this very important treaty. One more obstacle on the way to nuclear disarmament is being cleared.

And yet nuclear tests still go on. Last year, for example, the United States carried out eight nuclear explosions, France—six, China—two, the USSR—one and Britain—one.

Those opposed to ending the tests claim that it is impossible to keep the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons in constant operational readiness without them. Under their pressure the U.S. Senate, for example, in ratifying the 1974 treaty demanded guarantees to ensure "the conduct of effective and permanent nuclear tests programs" and the retention of modern nuclear laboratories to ensure "constant progress in nuclear equipment." It is not difficult to understand what this means. I will only add that what is involved here is not only the verification of existing weapons nor is it their partial modernization. The switch to the creation of new, third-generation nuclear weapons is being prepared.

Yes, the threat of universal nuclear destruction has markedly declined today. The Soviet-U.S. treaties on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments are visible evidence of this. But the lessening of the threat of nuclear war in no way equates to its complete elimination. All sensible steps toward this goal should be welcomed.

An end should be put to nuclear weapons tests. This demand is not only in line with the new political thinking and the doctrine of defense sufficiency, by which the Soviet Union is governed, it is also in accord with the vital interest of all mankind.

Kazakh President Orders Closure of Semipalatinsk Test Site

Decree Reported

LD2908230291 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 1500 GMT 29 Aug 91

[Text] The president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] has issued a decree on the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site:

Nuclear weapons tests have been conducted in Semipalatinsk Oblast in the territory of Kazakh SSR since 1949.

During this period about 500 nuclear explosions took place, which damaged the health and lives of thousands of people.

In view of the fact that the Kazakh Republic has fulfilled its duty in the creation of the nuclear potential that ensured strategic military parity between the USSR and the United States, and taking into consideration the demands of the citizens of the republic, I decree:

1. To close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
2. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, together with the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry to transform the Semipalatinsk test site into a Union- Republican research center, and to endorse its status and the list of the main trends of research in 1991.
3. In view of the fact that damage was done to the health of the population in the rayons near the Semipalatinsk test site in the air and underground by tests conducted from 1949 to 1962, the amount and procedure of compensation to citizens of the Kazakh SSR who have been affected is to be determined jointly with the Union bodies.
4. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, together with the Union ministries and departments involved in the staging of nuclear explosions on the republic's territory should endorse the program of social and economic development and improvement of living standards and medical services for the population of Semipalatinsk, Karaganda, and Pavlodar Oblasts adjoining the range, and to draw on finance from appropriate Union sources for this purpose.

The decree comes into force from the moment of its adoption.

[Signed] Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR, City of Alma-Ata, 29 August 1991.

Meeting Demands Closure

OW2908203591 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1845 GMT 29 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A meeting, organised by the political parties and other Kazakh social organisations, was held on 29th August in the Kazakh Academy of Sciences building in Alma Ata. The participants demanded the closure of the Semipalatinsk Polygon, where nuclear tests are carried out.

Many of the speakers criticized Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement that the Russian Federation may press territorial claims against other republics. Other speakers welcomed the suggestion of declaring the Cosmodrome at Baikonur the property of Kazakhstan.

The meeting adopted a resolution calling for the immediate closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear polygon.

"INTERFAX" has since learnt that Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev today (August 29th) signed a decree closing down the Semipalatinsk test site.

'Wave of Meetings' Greets Decree

LD3008215791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0705 GMT 30 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Mirkhat Nigmatullin]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 30 August (TASS)—The signing on Thursday [29 August] of a decree by the president of Kazakhstan on the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site has been accompanied by a wave of meetings in the neighboring oblasts and rayons. They were dedicated to the 42d anniversary of the first nuclear test on Semipalatinsk soil. Participants in the meeting demanded the elimination of all military test sites on the territory of Kazakhstan and the declaration of Kazakhstan as a demilitarized, free state.

In the very capital of the republic representatives of the democratic parties and movements, organizations and societies of Alma-Ata spoke with concern about the consequences of many years of tests on nuclear weapons in the republic and of the political situation in the country. In their words, the renewal of explosions is the way to new dangerous precedents, to a direct infringement on the sovereignty of the Kazakhstan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and would make it impossible to sign the new Union treaty.

The USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Air Force Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov stated on Thursday in front of the country's Supreme Soviet when he was being confirmed in this post that "the Semipalatinsk test site will no longer be used."

At a meeting in Alma-Ata a statement by representatives of the democratic movements of Kazakhstan was read out which, in particular, raises the issue of calling an extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet and which condemns the territorial claims of Russia. Having read it out, Sultan Sartayev, a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR and president of the association of lawyers, noted that a rejigging of borders threatens catastrophe and that the territory of Kazakhstan is inalienable. In the words of Sartayev, Kazakhstan will not refuse to sign the Union treaty, but the future Union can only be a confederation. Anything else is unacceptable to us.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Brazil-Chile-Argentina Ban on CBW Welcomed

PY0809220291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 6 Sep 91

[By Valentin Mashkin]

[Text] In the Argentine town of Mendoza, the host government, Brazil, and Chile signed an agreement in

which they promise not to produce chemical or bacteriological weapons [CBW].

This report has been received with delight in our country. The truth is that the USSR has long been advocating the prohibition of all types of mass-destruction weapons. Let us recall that in 1987 the USSR stopped the production of chemical weapons [CW], and in 1989 it decided to destroy its reserves. Long before that, in 1975, our country gave the United Nations a letter ratifying a convention approved by the international community forbidding the research, production, and storage of reserves of bacteriological and toxic weapons [BW].

There is no agreement or condition regarding the destruction of chemical weapons except for the Geneva protocol signed in 1925. This protocol, however, only states that the use of this weapon is forbidden, but says nothing about the prohibition of its production.

It is true that some progress has been achieved now in this regard. At the UN Conference on Disarmament held a few days ago in Geneva, a debate was held on [words indistinct] at the next session set for January 1992 will be approved by the international community. This announcement was made by Horacio Arteaga, Venezuelan representative and chairman of the session that has just ended.

The Latin American countries that signed the Mendoza agreement must try to keep up with current events, or even get ahead, because this agreement obviously deserves everyone's approval. However, the presence of OAS Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares at the signing ceremony would have given greater significance to the treaty. It is also appropriate to mention that the need to ban all types of mass-destruction weapons was proposed at the first Ibero-American summit held in the Mexican town of Guadalajara. It is appropriate to mention that Argentina and Brazil recently had assumed the commitment of not producing the atomic bomb.

And finally, it is also appropriate to mention one final point. With the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Latin America has become the first denuclearized zone in the world. In other words, Latin American countries have greatly contributed to mankind's struggle against the threat of cataclysmic wars of a nuclear or bacteriological nature. Congratulations.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

North Korea's 'Propaganda Duel' With South, U.S. Viewed

SK2708072391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1330 GMT 26 Aug 91

[Commentary by Mikhail Popov]

[Text] If the United States and the ROK authorities are genuinely interested in turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, they should come to talks with the DPRK at an early date, said a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement released in Pyongyang.

Station commentator Mikhail Popov writes: The talks that have been conducted so far between the two sides of Korea bear a close resemblance to a propaganda duel.

Former ROK Foreign Minister Choe Ho-chung recently said: Whenever we put forward some constructive proposals, the North, too, came up with new proposals. So, we have been countering the North's proposals with new ones accordingly.

It is because of such a scenario that the issue of converting the Korean peninsula into nuclear-free zone is now being discussed. However, the discussion has borne no specific fruit at all. Nevertheless, this issue now seems to have been moved from the propagandist realm to a business-like atmosphere. For example, this year Pyongyang declared that it will reopen talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and that it will agree to an on-site inspection of nuclear facilities in its territory.

In the wake of this statement, an outline of the practical political interests have begun to show. Not only does Pyongyang expect to push for the settlement of the nuclear issue, but it may also be trying to demonstrate that it was actually responsive to the demand of the times.

Washington and Seoul, however, insisted that Pyongyang come up with practical measures to bear itself out. They wanted the North to guarantee that it would not go ahead with nuclear development.

Many people in the United States and the ROK believe that an affirmative settlement of this issue will lead to the discussion of the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South. Consequently, they no longer treat Pyongyang's new proposals of last month the same as previous ones. Pyongyang has offered a proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Seoul has gone so far as to state that it can discuss with the North the nuclear safety issue. This position of the South as such has been accepted affirmatively in the Pyongyang statement. This, too, gives us hope that talks between the two sides of Korea will become substantial.

GERMANY

Defense Minister on Hopes for Future Arms Talks

'Denuclearized Europe' Not Desired

AU2008074591 Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT*
in German 19 Aug 91 p 3

[Report by "NA": "In Favor of Substantial U.S. Military Presence in Europe"]

[Text] Duesseldorf, 17-18 August—Following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the beginning of conventional disarmament, nuclear weapons are now, more than ever before, political weapons. They will reduce the danger of a possible crisis turning into a military conflict. That was stated by Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the international summer course on national security in Kiel.

The summer course has been organized by the Institute of Political Sciences of Christian Albrecht University.

Stoltenberg said that in the future, nuclear weapons will be an instrument preventing the reemergence of threatening scenarios rather than a means of protecting ourselves in dangerous situations. He said that, to live up to this peace-keeping function and goal, the alliance must have the necessary weapons, even though they could be considerably reduced. The minister stressed once again that the Federal Republic of Germany does not plan to control or possess nuclear weapons; however, it is in Germany's special interest not to become a zone of lesser protection by unilaterally renouncing nuclear protection.

Stoltenberg advocated early negotiations on the elimination of nuclear artillery shells and land-based missiles in Europe. He added, however, that in agreement with the German allies, and based on NATO's London statement, the Federal Government does not want Europe to be denuclearized.

Stoltenberg said that NATO does not need to be given a new meaning; however, its basic strategic concept must be adapted to the security situation, which has undergone far-reaching change. According to Stoltenberg, the NATO forces can be clearly reduced quantitatively. However, NATO continues to need modern main defense forces as well as common, highly mobile rapid deployment forces. The reformulation of NATO's strategy will be completed by the end of the year.

Stoltenberg advocated a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe. He said that, viewed politically and militarily, the United States is also a European power. Europe and the United States have common security and stability interests, said Stoltenberg; therefore, it is important and in line with the statements made at the London NATO summit that the U.S. troops stay in Europe in multinational structures and in certain forms of military integration that have to be newly developed. That

includes adequate participation in the rapid deployment forces, said the defense minister.

In Stoltenberg's words, the development of a European security structure requires the readiness and ability of all member states not only to claim equal rights but also to take over equal duties. This makes it so important for Germany to have the greater leeway of action for collective military measures that the Federal Government seeks to achieve. Stoltenberg said: "Without our readiness to make this possible within the framework of Political Union by formulating it in the treaty on the Political Union and within the framework of the United Nations by making clarifying supplementary statements, our credibility regarding the claim that we are defending freedom and the rule of law internationally would be considerably called into question."

Seeks Further Nuclear Weapons Cuts

LD2208132391 Hamburg DPA in German 1124 GMT
22 Aug 91

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—After the success of the democratic forces in the Soviet Union, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] hopes for a further reduction of nuclear weapons in the East and West. Stoltenberg said on breakfast television on SAT-1 today that following the victory of democracy in Moscow the Vienna agreement on conventional disarmament and the treaty on the reduction of the intercontinental missiles systems could now finally be ratified. This had been endangered by the events in the Soviet Union in the last few days.

Stoltenberg said he is convinced that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from eastern Germany as planned by the end of 1994. Staying any longer would make no sense from the Soviet Union's point of view in the long-term after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and conclusion of the treaties. In this sense he has not had any doubts about Soviet treaty compliance over the past few days. [passage omitted]

Reports on Continuing Soviet Troop Pullout

Not Affected by Coup Attempt

AU2608123591 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 25 Aug 91 p 5

["H.S." report: "Former NVA Soldiers Loyal in Crisis"]

[Text] Berlin—Apparently, fears that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops might be delayed because of the changes in Moscow are unfounded. In an interview for WELT AM SONNTAG, Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven, 54, commander of the Bundeswehr Corps and Territorial Command East said that there are even indications "that the plan has been partly overfulfilled."

During the crisis in the Soviet Union, the contacts that the Bundeswehr maintains with the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces "stood the test." Therefore, special

measures were not taken. The soldiers of the former National People's Army [NVA] who are now serving in the Bundeswehr were not impressed by the upheaval in Moscow. According to Von Scheven, they "acted loyally" in the critical days.

Foreign Minister Favors Quicker Pullout

*LD2608090291 Berlin ADN in German 0651 GMT
26 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Cologne (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher thinks it is necessary to largely reorganize international and the German relations with the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

According to Genscher, the Federal Government would welcome it if the new Moscow leadership decides on a quicker withdrawal of the 273,000 Soviet soldiers still stationed on German soil. The foreign minister stressed that the withdrawal is currently taking place more quickly than agreed in the treaty. However, a further acceleration of the process is also in the best interests of the USSR, as the continued maintenance of the still disproportionately large troop contingents represents an unbearable burden for the people. In addition, Genscher said, intensified economic cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union also offers prospects for the employment of demobilized soldiers.

Withdrawal Ahead of Schedule

*LD2908191991 Hamburg DPA in German 1854 GMT
29 Aug 91*

[Excerpt] Augsburg (DPA)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops based in Germany might be concluded considerably earlier than agreed in the treaty between Bonn and Moscow. In an interview with the AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE (Friday edition), Willy Wimmer, parliamentary state secretary at the Federal Defense Ministry, confirmed that the USSR has already fulfilled the annual withdrawal plan for 1991.

This is all the more remarkable as the "start-up year" represents "the most difficult period from the logistical point of view" for the withdrawal. If the pace is maintained the withdrawal could theoretically be concluded by the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Gives Figures

*LD3008205191 Berlin ADN in German 1443 GMT
30 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Augsburg/Bonn (ADN)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Germany may be completed much earlier than contractually agreed between Bonn and Moscow. Willy Wimmer, parliamentary secretary of state in the Defense Ministry, confirmed today that the USSR has already fulfilled the annual withdrawal plan for 1991. This is all the more notable in that the first year of withdrawal was the "most difficult time from a

logistic point of view," Wimmer told the AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE. If the present rate is maintained, then the withdrawal could in theory be completed as early as the end of 1992 or early 1993. [passage omitted]

A Defense Ministry spokesman stated today that 80,000 soldiers as well as 25,000 civilian employees and families had returned to the USSR by the end of August out of the 98,000 soldiers and 51,000 civilians scheduled to be pulled out this year. The quota of 1,000 combat tanks to be withdrawn has already been exceeded. Around 1,200 have been withdrawn. Of the scheduled 444,000 tonnes of materials, including ammunition, 320,000 tonnes have been returned. The dispatch of 1,500 armored vehicles out of a total 2,900 is also in accordance with the plan.

Foreign Minister Urges Western Initiative on SNF

*LD2708082991 Berlin ADN in German 0717 GMT
27 Aug 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has called for a Western initiative on disarmament negotiations in the field of short-range nuclear weapons [SNF]. In an interview with the Radio Service N.S.R. [Radiodienst N.S.R.] he said that developments in the past few days in the Soviet Union have strongly signaled "that it is high time that short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery shells—both things which are difficult to oversee and check—should go as quickly as possible, throughout the world." For this reason it is necessary "for a Western initiative to be developed which would remove these nuclear weapons in East and West." Strategic nuclear weapons would still remain, but the danger that the number of those having them might increase would lessen.

Genscher went on to say: "The concern that there would be various additional holders of nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union falls apart is a justified concern." However, there is the hope that the republics who wanted to stay together "would achieve fresh internal stability." According to Genscher, the three Baltic republics would certainly not be among them.

Genscher warned against overly high expectations about the speed of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany. A speeding up would certainly be welcome, "but I do not think that how fast the withdrawal proceeds, and whether it occurs faster than envisaged in the treaty, is a question of good or bad will—it is more a question of accommodating and employing those members of the armed services."

Foreign Minister on Prospects for Arms Talks With USSR

Discusses Further Cuts With RSFSR Aide

*LD3008171291 Berlin ADN in German 1310 GMT
30 Aug 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Germany is interested in further developing relations with the Russian Federation, especially broad economic cooperation. Foreign Minister

Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed this to Vladimir Fedorov, deputy foreign minister of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, in Bonn today. Genscher made it clear that Bonn would welcome current developments in the Soviet Union leading to fresh stability. The Federal Government will adapt to the structures currently being formed in relations with the Union and the republics.

The German foreign minister emphasized the need to make progress both on conventional and nuclear disarmament. Above all, short-range nuclear missiles and artillery shells have to be removed from East and West as quickly as possible. Fedorov briefed Genscher on the Russian Government's intention of reducing the defense budget.

Supports Disarmament Advocates

*LD3108102191 Hamburg DPA in German 0952 GMT
31 Aug 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has spoken out in favor of supporting forces in the Soviet Union who back disarmament. In an interview for Radio Berlin Aktuell today, Genscher reported that the Government of the Russian Republic informed him yesterday of its determination to reduce drastically military expenditure.

Against this backdrop, Genscher renewed his support for a fresh disarmament initiative by the West to ensure in conjunction with the Soviet Union that nuclear short-range missiles and the nuclear artillery "disappear once and for all."

Genscher said: "No one can have any interest in a proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union, but rather the contrary: this is a chance to eliminate nuclear short-range missiles and nuclear artillery shells." The strategic nuclear systems, the dismantling of which the United States and the Soviet Union are negotiating, are more easily subject to verification and control, Genscher said.

Wants Short-Range Nuclear Arms Banned

*LD0109154791 Berlin ADN in German 1509 GMT
1 Sep 91*

[Text] Mainz (ADN)—Regarding events in the USSR, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher described as urgent a Western initiative "which would get rid of nuclear short-range weapons and nuclear artillery munition at once and everywhere." Such weapons no longer have any significance. "If they ever had one, the time has now come to free the world from nuclear artillery munition and short-range weapons," Genscher said today in an interview with ZDF's (Second German Television) "Bonn Direkt" program (to be broadcast at 1910).

The Federal Republic of Germany has an interest in the USSR not disintegrating completely. It will respect the sovereignty of the individual republics completely. "If

they maintain a loose association or build a confederation, that is primarily a decision for the republics," he said. It is important that this does not

Seeks 'Irreversible' Disarmament

*AU0109172191 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
30 Aug 91 pp 5-6*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Dieter Buhl and Theo Sommer; place and date not given: "The World Is Basically Changed"]

[Excerpts] [DIE ZEIT] Mr. Minister, in 1989 Eastern Europe was freed, in 1990 Germany was reunified, and in 1991 the Soviet Union is exploding. The conditions of German, European, and international policy are basically changing. How are we affected by this?

[Genscher] The world has been basically changed by the failure of the coup and the fact that the changes that took place in the Central and Eastern European states and in eastern Germany before are now being made in the Soviet Union. We are experiencing the second stage of a democratic revolution in the Soviet Union. The first, which was initiated by Gorbachev, was a revolution from above. Now it is a powerful democratic revolution from below, which is supported and headed by important democratically elected representatives, but is nevertheless a revolution of the people. [passage omitted]

[DIE ZEIT] Do the Germans themselves have to do more? Or have we done everything in our power?

[Genscher] In addition to the payments that we are making for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Germany—and this withdrawal is in the interest of all states in Europe—we have considerably strained our capacity to make the payments that we have promised to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union.

[DIE ZEIT] Who should actually get the money if the Soviet Union crumbles?

[Genscher] These are payments that we are making for specific projects, such as the construction of apartments for the returning Soviet soldiers. For us it is not so important who will own these apartments in the end, whether it is a republic or the federation; for us it is more important that the soldiers can live there so they withdraw in time.

[DIE ZEIT] Do we have to pay even more or is it now somebody else's turn?

[Genscher] We, too, have to make some effort once again, but not alone, and others must do so more strongly than we. No one can be interested in having the FRG overtax its capacity to such an extent that in the end it cannot be the dynamic economic power that is important for all Europeans.

[DIE ZEIT] Are you calling for an reversed [umgekehrt] burden sharing?

[Genscher] Not a reversed one but an orderly burden sharing, which is measured by the capacity of the Western industrial nations and not by the geographical closeness to or distance from Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

[DIE ZEIT] In the West many warned before the putsch against relying too much on disarmament. After the failure of this attempted coup, is there a new impulse for disarmament?

[Genscher] I have always been convinced of the irreversibility of democratic development in the Soviet Union. And the disarmament process must also be irreversible.

Regarding disarmament, it will be important for us to counter a new dimension of the spreading of nuclear weapons.

[DIE ZEIT] You mean that in a crumbling Soviet Union there must not be any new owners of nuclear weapons, and that we would then have four or five instead of one nuclear power?

[Genscher] This would be a new form of proliferation.

[DIE ZEIT] What is necessary?

[Genscher] There are two levels at which something must be done. What is necessary now is an initiative to eliminate the short-range nuclear weapons all over the world.

[DIE ZEIT] This means above all on German territory?

[Genscher] If I say all over the world, this means in the West and East. One cannot expect the other side to do this unilaterally.

It will be the task of all those who now bear responsibility to make the power of disposition over the still existing strategic weapons so unambiguously clear that this does not pose a security risk for the world.

[DIE ZEIT] Do you know who had the power of disposition over the nuclear weapons during the days of the putsch?

[Genscher] One must assume that it was the defense minister, who participated in the coup.

[DIE ZEIT] What about conventional disarmament?

[Genscher] We also need an initiative for conventional disarmament. We cannot foresee the structure of the armed forces in the Soviet Union. The secession of republics from the Union and the sovereignty of the states in a newly structured Union must not lead to a strengthening of conventional armed forces. On the contrary, this development should be understood as an opportunity to take a drastic new step.

[DIE ZEIT] NATO is on the point of giving itself a new strategy in view of the changed situation. One no longer speaks of threats, only of risks. These are rather hypothetical.

[Genscher] One could also say: They are different risks.

[DIE ZEIT] Different military risks?

[Genscher] No. We have a concept of security that is not narrowed down to the purely military aspect.

[DIE ZEIT] How should one imagine the security architecture in the year 2000? NATO will lose importance, although perhaps not political importance; the Western European Union will gain in military importance; the CSCE will develop its own muscles? Where is the United States' place in this variety of security structures?

[Genscher] NATO will not lose importance. It will have fewer military potentials, but its weight for stability in Europe and the weight of its member states for this stability will be perhaps even greater. In this connection, stability is really not defined in a strictly military sense but in a comprehensive sense.

What I said about the new priorities in the EC means an expansion of the EC's political, economic, social, and ecological stability zone to all of Europe.

In such an structure, the United States plays a considerable role. It is linked with us through NATO and it participates in the CSCE. In view of the current development in the Soviet Union, the CSCE will gain even more importance. It will have to strengthen its organs. What we now have as a conflict-prevention center and as an emergency mechanism must lead to some sort of European Security Council. [passage omitted]

Talks on Western Troops in FRG To Open 5 Sep
LD3008113291 Hamburg DPA in German 1028 GMT
30 Aug 91

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—The first international conference on the stationing of Western troops since Germany achieved sovereignty will begin in Bonn on 5 September, it was learned in Bonn today. It was also made known that the Americans spoke out against and voiced reservations about a renegotiation of the former "troops statute." Meanwhile, Washington, however, has appointed a delegation for the negotiations. The other countries involved who have troops in Germany are Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada.

The round of negotiations, limited for the time being to two days, was convened by the Federal Government. Here it referred to a review clause in the supplementary agreement on the status of NATO troops, which in practical terms has been continually renewed since the Troops Statute of 1952, which ended the rights of the occupiers. The sovereignty of Germany no longer permits the old rules to be applied further without changes, it was said. Neither representatives from the Defense Ministry nor the Foreign Ministry wished to make an official comment on the subject.

Apparently the essential question is that of adapting the responsibilities. They refer to legal interpretations and to the previously great responsibilities of the allied troops on German territory. Experts already reckon that negotiations will last a long time.

ITALY

Foreign Minister Links Mideast Peace Talks, CSCM

PM1508155291 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
14 Aug 91 pp 1, 10

[Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis article: "'Arafat Is Not Alone—European's Honor'"]

[Excerpts] The peace negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict that the world has awaited for almost 25 years could begin as soon as October. This hope is prompted in us by Bush's and Gorbachev's joint statement in Moscow, by the positive responses from Syria and Israel, and by the general amenability of the Arab world. Not all the problems have been resolved, especially that of the Palestinian delegation's composition. Experience teaches us that in the Middle East the final step is always the most difficult.

Nevertheless, we would not want the general sense of relief at the prospect of such a long-awaited event to be marred by pessimism about its actual effectiveness on account of the exclusion of the Palestinian problem from a political and diplomatic process pursued so tenaciously. This seemed to me to be the thrust of Alberto Jacoviello's article in LA REPUBBLICA, which he justifies by citing what he sees as the isolation of 'Arafat's PLO, for which he blames Europe, too, hitherto in favor of a just and lasting solution of the Palestinian problem. [passage omitted]

Last, a few brief observations about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which some have seen as an irresponsible and vague plan precisely vis-a-vis the course of the initial negotiations for the peace conference.

From the outset we have presented our proposal as complementary to a specific peace initiative, making it clear that it should be combined with it—but not

according to any predetermined sequence, either preceding, following, or accompanying specific negotiations on the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

We have frequently repeated that the most important thing is the application of the Helsinki philosophy to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, too. In other words, the creation of a climate of mutual trust on the basis of principles and rules that will facilitate the solution of the existing conflicts in the region. We have stressed the fact that a dialogue based on such an approach would have made it possible to begin direct negotiations.

Well, the regional peace conference is taking shape in a way that in many respects resembles our original proposal, starting with the question of attendance. Indeed, following the latest American proposal to the Maghreb countries, virtually all those that we had in mind—apart from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Yugoslavia—will be present, albeit in different forms. In its initial phase the plenary conference has a significance no different from that of the CSCM, including the idea of advancing the quadripartite approach in parallel with direct negotiations between Israel on the one hand and the Arabs and Palestinians on the other. All this, to broach a series of issues ranging from economic cooperation to security and thus to create a new climate of mutual trust.

If the conference does take off in the fall it will be possible to strengthen and extend this approach, and thus to make possible, in the immediate future and probably as early as 1992, a qualitative leap forward to a fully fledged Mediterranean Helsinki conference.

By no means disillusioned, we are therefore preparing to resume work in the near future in the previously chosen direction, waiting merely to be sure that a resumption of our initiative will not interfere with the start of the regional peace conference. Our first appointment is the Algiers meeting of countries of regional cooperation in the Western Mediterranean (on the one hand France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, and on the other Mauritania, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.) With our approval, Egypt and Greece could certainly also be involved in this, in a Mediterranean dialogue extended to the whole of northern Africa and the whole of EC Europe. We will thus satisfy a further precondition for a broader CSCM, which seems to us more necessary every day.

NORWAY

Agreement on Cruise Missiles Said Next Goal

91EN0768A Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
19 Jul 91 p 10

[Interview with Svein Melby, researcher at the Foreign Policy Institute, and Defense Ministry Under Secretary Elsa Eriksen by Erik Sagflaet; place and date not given: "Missiles at Sea Increase Pressure in Northern Areas"—first paragraph is ARBEIDERBLADET introduction]

[Text] The transition from landbased to seabased nuclear weapons may mean that the ocean areas around Norway could have greater significance as an arena for superpower confrontations. It is thus important for Norway that the Start agreement be followed up with a new agreement which will reduce the number of weapons located at sea and on planes. But it will be extremely difficult to achieve.

"Even if the Start agreement leads to a welcome reduction in the total number of nuclear warheads, we will have an arms structure which in regional, local, Norwegian terms will bring sensitive things along with it," Svein Melby, a researcher at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute told ARBEIDERBLADET.

More At Sea

Svein Melby said that it is still difficult to obtain a full overview of all of the details in the Start agreement. Nevertheless two general trends seem clear:

"The first is a move away from land-based to sea-based missiles. While the total number is reduced, at the same time a greater share of the long-range ballistic missiles than ever before will be put on submarines. The second is a trend in the direction of reducing the ballistic sector while at the same time having greater freedom to develop cruise missiles. A large number of these will be put on airplanes, but some will also be put on submarines."

[Sagflaat] What will this mean for Norway?

[Melby] When all is said and done, we will see a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons. But of those that remain, a greater number will be located at sea. The confrontation has now been reduced. But if we think a bit in old-fashioned terms—the superpowers will continue to keep watch on one another—then a greater share of this confrontation in nuclear terms will be placed in the northern areas. With greater emphasis on sea- and airplane-based weapons, it is easy to imagine the northern areas looking more interesting. This does not mean a greater number of submarines off Norway, but of those that remain, a larger share of the nuclear-powered ones will be in our vicinity.

Stabilizing

[Melby] The most positive thing about the Start agreement is that it goes after the weapons systems which carry the greatest risk of a nuclear war in a crisis situation, Melby said. The land-based intercontinental missiles are easy to use, they're accurate, and they're hard to protect. So they have a dangerous element which is that you are tempted to use them in order not to lose them. Sea-based missiles are trickier to use, and they are not as vulnerable. The temptation for quick first use is less. This contributes to greater stability in a crisis situation as well.

[Sagflaat] Now that the Start agreement appears to have been approved, how can we proceed further?

[Melby] It is in Norway's interest to follow up on Start, and for us also to proceed to limit the number of weapons as regards those sea- and air-based systems which remain. But I don't know how that can be achieved, and I'm afraid Norwegian points of view won't have much impact. Political developments have reduced the significance of these agreements. The pressure isn't as great as before, and the superpowers are choosing their priorities differently.

[Sagflaat] What is getting priority now?

[Melby] At the moment we have a stable situation between the superpowers. So it's possible they will prefer to concentrate on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and the spread of missile technology. In this regard the United States has indicated this is a priority for them, and I believe the Soviet Union has the same interest. Whether this will succeed is another matter. In this area such big economic interests are at stake that one wonders whether the two superpowers will be able to manage the whole thing.

Welcome Agreement

"It's good that we have come up with an agreement which will reduce strategic nuclear weapons by 12 percent," Undersecretary Elsa Eriksen of the Ministry of Defense told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Elsa Eriksen said that the Ministry still does not have detailed information about the agreement itself, and about where the changes will occur after the breakthrough in London.

[Eriksen] What we know is that we will see a reduction with regard to submarines, land-based missiles, and airplanes. But the agreement does not say where the reductions will happen. It's up to the parties whether they want to reduce in the north or possibly in the Mediterranean Sea.

[Sagflaat] Is there a danger of increased pressure in the north?

[Eriksen] No, I wouldn't say so. We know there will be a reduction there as well, and on the Kola Peninsula. This, in any event, is welcome. But we don't yet know for sure what relative distribution there will be between land and sea.

[Sagflaat] Should the agreement be followed up further?

[Eriksen] With the quantities of strategic nuclear weapons both sides have, there are clear grounds for proceeding further. I hope there can be a Start II agreement.

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